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Abstrakt 
Diplomová práca pojednáva o hrozbe námrazy v letovej prevádzke. V prvej časti práce sa 
nachádza popis námrazy z meteorologického hľadiska. V úvode je zadefinovaný jav 
námrazy, doplnený opisom vzniku námrazy. Práca pokračuje uvedením rôznych druhov 
námrazy. V tejto časti práce sú opísané typy námrazy podľa jej intenzity a podľa definícií v 
leteckých predpisoch. Následne je priblížený princíp identifikácie námrazy odborníkmi z 
oblasti meteorológie a z oblasti letectva. Práca opisuje nástroje a vybavenie používané pre 
rozpoznanie námrazy. V ďalšej časti práce je analyzovaný vplyv námrazy na letovú 
prevádzku, na lietadlo a na jeho systémy. Kapitola 4 sa venuje nebezpečným 
meteorologickým javom, ktoré naznačujú prítomnosť námrazy. Zvyšok práce je zameraný 
na bezpečnostnú analýzu námrazy za letu. Kapitola 6 obsahuje návrhy na zlepšenie úrovne 
bezpečnosti a elimináciu rizika námrazy v letovej prevádzke. Záver práce obsahuje náhľad 
na metódy, ktoré budú v budúcnosti používané pri predpovediach námrazy.   
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Abstract 
The thesis treats a hazard of the icing in the flight operations. In the first part of the work, a 
description of the meteorological aspect of the icing can be found. At the beginning, the 
phenomenon of icing is defined and completed by a description of icing formation. The work 
continues by defining the types of icing. It contains a description of the intensity 
classification and an overview on the regulatory classification of icing. Subsequently the 
process of icing identification is described by the meteorologists on the one hand and by the 
pilots on the other hand. It provides the definition of the products and the equipment used 
for the icing identification. In the next part of the work, an influence of icing on the flight 
operations (on the airframe, on the instruments, on the propulsion system and on the 
windscreen) is analyzed. Chapter 4 identifies the areas representing the highest risk for the 
flight operations. The rest of the work elaborates on the safety risk analysis of the icing in 
flight. In Chapter 6 an attempt to find out the ways how to increase the safety level and how 
to decrease the hazard of icing related occurrences is proposed. Finally, the new methods of 
icing forecasts are described in the thesis. 
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Units 
Quantity name Unit name 
Mass Pound ( lb, 1 lb = 0,45 kg ) 
Speed Knot ( kt, 1 kt = 1,852 km/hour) 
Altitude Foot (ft, 1 ft = 0,3048 m) 
Temperature Celsius (°C) 
Abbreviations 
Abbreviation name Abbreviation meaning (SK) Abbreviation meaning (EN) 
AAL Nad úrovňou letiska Above Aerodrome Level 
ACARS  Lietadlový komunikačný a 
oznamovací systém 
Aircraft Communication 
Addressing and Reporting 
System 
AEA Asociácia Európskych 
Aerolínií 
Association of European 
Airlines 
Ac Altocumulus Altocumulus 
Cu Cumulus Cumulus 
Cb Cumulonimbus Cumulonimbus 
Ns Nimbostratus Nimbostratus 
Sc  Stratocumulus Stratocumulus 
St Stratus Stratus 
CS 25 Požiadavky pre certifikáciu 
lietadiel  
Certification Specifications 
for aircraft 
CS - E Požiadavky pre certifikáciu 
lietadlových motorov 
Certification Specifications 
For Engines 
EASA Európska agentúra pre 
bezpečnosť letectva 
European Aviation Safety 
Agency 
ICAO Medzinárodná organizácia 
pre civilné letectvo 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization 
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IFR Pravidlá pre let podľa 
prístrojov 
Instrument Flight Rules 
ISO Medzinárodná organizácia 
pro normalizáciu 
International Standards 
Organization 
LWC  Obsah tekutej vody Liquid Water Content 
PIREP Správa o počasí z letu Pilot report 
SIGMET  Meteorologická správa o 
význačnom počasí 
Significant Meteorological 
Information 
RPM Otáčky za minútu Revolutions Per Minute 
SAE Odborná spoločnosť pre 
automobilový priemysel 
Society of Automotive 
Engineers 
TAMDAR Správa z leteckého 
meteorologického 
prieskumu troposféry 
Tropospheric Airborne 
Meteorological Data Report 
HOT  Hold-over time 
MMEL Hlavný súpis minimálneho 
vybavenia lietadla 
Minimum Master 
Equipment List 
FAR Letecký úrad Spojených 
štátov amerických 
Federal Aviation 
Regulation 
FIR Letová Informačná Oblasť Flight Information Region 
HF Vysoké Frekvencie High Frequency 
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Introduction 
The aviation industry is dependent on the several sources of information to maintain current 
level of safety.  One of the most important sources is a meteorological service. It supplies 
aviation personnel with the most accurate forecasts, reports, charts and other available 
information about the weather conditions. Icing is one of them. It plays an important role in 
aviation weather.  
Planes used in the commercial aviation nowadays are able to fly IFR inside some types of 
clouds. During one flight they can fly through many different air masses that don´t have the 
same characteristics (temperature, humidity …). This may represent a real risk for the 
aircraft.  
Icing is one of the most significant hazards for the safe and efficient operation of aircraft in 
these conditions. The highest risk of icing exists in the lower parts of the troposphere where 
humidity is present at the higher concentration. Jet aircraft normally fly in these altitudes 
only during climbing to the cruising level and during approaching for landing. But turbo-
propeller planes and piston aircraft very often don´t have a possibility to overfly complicated 
weather conditions. Their cruising level is sometimes still affected by hazardous weather 
phenomena as icing is.  
The icing reduces aircraft performance in a number of ways. Unfortunately, it´s proven by a 
fact that 30 % of accidents in commercial aviation are caused by icing. (Labyt, 2008) One 
of the latest accidents caused by icing took place near Tyumen in Western Siberia on 2 April 
2012 and ended by death of 33 persons on board. ATR 72 of UTair airlines performing 
domestic flight from Tyumen to Surgut crashed after take-off in a field located just a few 
miles from a runway in use. A final report from the investigation committee states that the 
aircraft took off with ice deposit on the airframe and stalled during the initial climb at 688 
feet AAL.1 (GUTTERMAN, 2012) 
In the United States of America the airframe icing resulted in 583 accidents and more than 
800 fatalities between years 1982 and 2000. (PETTY, 2000) The number of accidents caused 
by icing slightly decreased in comparison with the documented icing related accidents from 
year 1975 to 1988. During these 13 years more than 803 accidents happened that were caused 
by icing.  
But is this decreasing rate satisfactory? Recently a lot of studies have been made to better 
understand the conditions associated with the icing. One of them was a research of 
                                                 
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/uk-russia-crash-idUSLNE83202D20120403 
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supercooled large droplets influence on the flight safety. It was performed as a reaction on 
the accident of American Eagle Flight 4184 when ATR 72 crashed after flying into unknown 
icing conditions. Another comprehensive investigation started after the disappearance of 
A330 of Air France airline during the flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. It was 
inconceivable that one of the most modern airliners with an excellent safety record and the 
latest technology could simply disappear. (PALMER, 2013) One of the main causes of the 
accident was again the icing.  
It is difficult to forecast icing. As it´s written in a book of Aeronautical Meteorology from 
ENAC (Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile) the biggest problem of icing is that it´s not as 
obvious as other meteorological phenomena (visibility, precipitations, strong wind…) If you 
are not prepared, trained or you forget to think about the risk of icing, it can surprise you 
violently and quite often very late to recover it. 
Apart from the meteorological icing, pilots also need to plan for the carburetor icing. I will 
not write about this type of icing in this work. The aim of the thesis is to study the icing 
mainly in the area of commercial aviation. There is a minor use of a piston engine aircraft 
that are influenced by the carburetor icing in the commercial aviation. Nevertheless it´s 
another icing phenomena that can be dangerous for the air safety in some specific conditions. 
The thesis is organized as follows. At the end of the Introduction part, you can find a 
definition of icing, completed by a description of icing formation.  
Chapter 1 characterizes types of icing as it is classified in aviation meteorology. It contains 
a description of the intensity classification. An overview on the regulatory classification of 
icing is described at the end of the first chapter.  
Chapter 2 consists of a process description of icing identification by the meteorologists on 
the one hand and by the pilots on the other hand. It also provides the description of the 
products and the equipment used for the icing identification. 
Chapter 3 analyzes an influence of icing on the flight operations. It discusses the problems 
of ice accretion on the airframe, on the instruments, on the propulsion system and on the 
windscreen. 
Chapter 4 identifies the areas representing the highest risk for flight operations. It warns 
about a danger of flying in weather patterns that could have a big icing potential. For each 
hazardous area, the reason of icing presence is examined and it is completed by icing severity 
and by the type of icing that can be anticipated. 
Chapter 5 reviews the major safety occurrences caused by icing that happened in the last 20 
years in a commercial aviation. It is based on the official investigation reports published by 
14 
local authorities. The goal of each occurrence analysis is to reveal meteorological conditions 
which led to icing formation and to find an effect of icing on the flight safety. 
Chapter 6 expands on the Chapter 5 safety analysis and it tries to find out the ways how to 
increase the safety level and how to decrease the hazard of icing related occurrences. It 
figures out what precautions should be made to avoid situations studied in Chapter 5. 
The conclusion part summarizes the important findings of this thesis and briefly describes 
the new methods of icing forecasts. 
 
 
Definition of icing  
Icing is a specific form of contamination that consists of a deposit or coating of ice on an 
object such as an aircraft or part of it. Contamination means any deposit of lithometeors (dry 
particles suspended in the atmosphere such as dust, haze, smoke, and sand) or hydrometeors 
(any of various forms of water in liquid or solid form) on a surface. (Labyt, 2008) 
 
 
Icing formation 
In the atmosphere, there are existing three processes that lead to the formation of an ice 
deposit on a surface at the negative temperature: 
1. (Re)sublimation also known as “deposition”, which consists of water changing 
directly from vapor form to ice form. 
2. The freezing of residual water. 
3. It´s well known that below the temperature of 0 °C the water exists in form of ice. 
Very often this is not true. In this case, we speak about supercooled water. The 
supercooled water starts to freeze in presence of freezing nucleus. Another way how 
it can be transformed to ice is by hitting an airframe. It mainly occurs in a cloudy or 
rainy atmosphere. 
 
The amount of supercooled water present in the atmosphere decreases proportionally to a 
decreasing static air temperature. It´s rare to find some water in liquid form below -40°C, 
however in well-developed Cumulonimbus clouds it can happen. The size of supercooled 
water droplets changes with increasing altitude and decreasing temperature as it is presented 
in the Table 1.  
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Table 1 - Size of supercooled water droplets (Oxford: Oxford Aviation Academy, 2008) 
Temperature Size of droplets (diameter) 
0 °C to -20 °C Large (≥ 50 µm) and small 
-20 °C to -40 °C Only small (10 µm ≤ droplet ≤ 50 µm) 
Below -40 °C Only very small (≤ 10 µm). Freezing will 
occur without the aid of nuclei. 
The result of the supercooled droplet impact is uncertain due to the fact that freezing a small 
quantity of water can release sufficient latent heat to increase its temperature to 0 °C. 
Freezing can´t therefore really occur unless all the latent heat released is removed. 
At very low temperatures  (lower than -20 °C) and for very small droplets (with a diameter 
less than 10 µm) freezing occurs very quickly via a whole series of heat propagation modes, 
such as conduction, convection and evaporation. Freezing can therefore occurs almost 
instantaneously, since the latent heat released is used very quickly. At negative temperatures 
close to 0 °C, the freezing process can occur much more slowly. This is especially the case 
of large droplets that have enough time to spread over a surface, while remaining in liquid 
state before freezing. 
The droplet needs a special particle known as nucleus to be transformed into ice. The number 
of active nuclei is inversely proportional to the temperature. Very few droplets are active 
until the temperature decreases to -15 °C. Their activity quickly increases below this 
temperature. The freezing temperature depends on the diameter of the droplets too. The 
drops that have the diameter of over 1 mm generally freeze at temperature between -15 °C 
and -20 °C. Smaller droplets with a mean diameter of 20 µm freeze at about -30 °C. The 
smallest droplets can transform to the ice at temperatures as low as -40 °C. (Labyt, 2008)
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1 Types of icing 
It exists more kinds of icing classification. The first one is based on the three processes that 
were previously described, which leads to icing formation. Depending on  the weather 
conditions we can define the basic types of airframe icing as hoar frost, rime ice (soft ice), 
clear ice (hard ice, glaze ice) and several specific types of icing as mixed ice, rain ice (glazed 
frost) and pack snow. 
1.1 Basic icing types 
1.1.1 Hoar frost 
Formation: 
Hoar frost appears in the conditions when the air temperature reaches the saturation point 
and a surface of the aircraft is cooled to the freezing temperature. It is the only type of icing 
that can occur in clear air if we don´t speak about the ice crystals icing (described in the 
chapter 1.2.3). The water vapor that touches the airframe is directly transformed to ice 
crystals. This phenomena is known as desublimation or more precisely gas-to-solid 
condensation. It requires the presence of the desublimation nucleus that has often an 
inorganic composition (volcanic dust, clay, soil particles). Hoar frost appears both on the 
ground and in flight. On the ground it usually builds up on the airframe of the aircraft parked 
outside overnight. It is very similar to the frost that forms on a car windscreen. 
Figure 1 – Hoar frost deposit on a wing  
 
© (LABYT, 2008) 
In flight, hoar frost appears in case of rapid descent from a very cold air to a warm moist air 
layer. This icing type is often observed when the plane enters into the inversion layer from 
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a region where air temperature was below 0 °C. The hoar frost icing is not severe in intensity. 
It can be overcome by flying in a region where the temperature has positive value or by 
increasing air speed to intensify kinetic heating. (Oxford: Oxford Aviation Academy, 2008) 
Appearance: 
Hoar frost is a white crystal deposit in a form of needles, scales or feathers which make it 
quite brittle. It is very similar to the frost on the ground. (Labyt, 2008) 
1.1.2 Rime ice 
Formation: 
Inside the clouds, the rime ice is formed by rapid freezing of the supercooled drops or by 
very small cloud droplets in contact with a surface at negative temperature. A fast freezing 
of small water droplets causes that air bubbles contained in the water are trapped in the ice. 
The ice accretion occurs on the surfaces exposed to the relative airflow and it develops 
against the airflow direction. Ice doesn´t spread over aft wing surface because of the quick 
freezing process. Small airfoil shape changes can occur and air intakes can be affected. Rime 
ice is very often present in Ns, As, Ac, Sc, St and some Cumulus type clouds. (Labyt, 2008) 
Appearance: 
The rime ice has an opaque, white appearance that is making it fragile and brittle due to 
trapped air bubbles. 
Figure 2 – Rime ice accretion on the meteorological measuring equipment 
 
© (LABYT, 2008) 
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1.1.3 Clear ice 
Formation: 
Opposite to the rime ice, the clear ice formation is connected with a slow freezing process 
of supercooled water droplets. As it is a slow process, ice has enough time to spread over 
airframe surface, to create homogeneous layer without the air inclusion. The slow freezing 
process is mainly caused because of the release of latent heat, but the whole process involved 
is very complex. Only one droplet out of eighty droplets hitting the aircraft surface freezes 
immediately for each degree below freezing temperature. Clear ice is very dangerous for the 
flight safety point of view because of uneven build up on the aircraft that often causes 
problems with controls. The contamination of clear ice is frequently observed on the 
propellers where it can cause vibrations or skin damage when it is braked off. Typical clouds 
where a clear ice occurs are Ns, Cu and Cb at temperature between 0 °C and -20 °C. (Oxford: 
Oxford Aviation Academy, 2008) 
Appearance: 
Clear ice forms a transparent layer of ice without air inclusion. It can be characterized as 
homogeneous, smooth, clear, compact and very solid. (Labyt, 2008) It can spread over big 
airframe surface. 
Figure 3 – Clear ice on a leading edge 
 
© (LABYT, 2008)
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1.2 Specific icing types 
1.2.1 Mixed ice 
We speak about the mixed ice when clear ice and rime ice are formed simultaneously or in 
rapid alternations. This occurs in a cloudy atmosphere with a great variety of droplet sizes. 
The mixed ice formation depends on the variability of phenomena leading to the water 
freezing. 
Figure 4 – Type of icing accreted according to LWC and time exposure  
 
© (LABYT, 2008) 
1.2.2 Rain ice (glazed frost) 
One of the most dangerous types of icing is the rain ice. It is mainly formed in presence of 
fronts that separates air masses with different temperatures. The rain formed in a warmer air 
falls through the layer of colder air with temperature below 0 °C and it becomes supercooled. 
Clear ice is formed when it hits an airframe. Rain ice builds up very quickly. Pilot has to 
take immediate action to overcome it. Rain ice is particularly associated with the moderate 
continuous rain which often falls from Ns clouds. (Oxford: Oxford Aviation Academy, 
2008) 
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1.2.3 Pack snow (graupel), ice crystals 
Pack snow is formed when snow is combined by supercooled water droplets. In some cases, 
it can block probes and engine intakes, but normally it doesn´t have any dangerous 
consequences. 
Ice crystals lead to similar problems, but their formation process is slightly different. A 
hazard of ice crystals icing exists in high altitudes where a strong convection activity lifts an 
important quantity of the water. The warm moist air, which contains high water quantity, 
cools while it climbs. The water condenses and freezes subsequently while it is forming 
small ice particles – the ice crystals. In high altitudes, in the tropopause layer, strong winds 
(jet-streams) move ice crystals far away from the clouds where they are formed. That´s why 
ice crystals are very difficult to detect. In case of Air France flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro 
to Paris ice crystals were one of the mains causes of the accident (described in chapter 5.1.8). 
They blocked the pitot tubes of the aircraft and disorientated the crew. Ice crystals don´t 
form a deposit on a smooth and clean airframe. Ice crystals can be trapped by the droplets 
freezing on the contaminated surfaces in clouds. When warm surface is hit by ice crystals, 
they can melt and stick aft of the warm surfaces. If a big amount of ice crystals is present, it 
can result in probes blockage or engines problems. (Duvivier, 2010) 
1.3 Intensity classification 
The other type of icing classification is defined in the ICAO documents. Three main types 
of the icing severity exist in Europe: light, moderate and severe. They are more precisely 
defined in the Table 2. In the USA, one more level of the lowest icing intensity is defined as 
“trace”. The Intensity level expresses the state of the icing environment, the aircraft’s 
response, and the pilot’s assessment of the response. (Politovich, 2003) The classification 
shown in the Table 2 is used by the pilots. The symbols shown in the Table 2 are visualized 
on the significant weather charts (SIGWX) where the areas representing the potential risk of 
icing for the flight can be found. 
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Table 2 – Atmospheric Icing Potential (Labyt, 2008) 
Icing intensity Light Moderate Severe 
Icing symbol     
Average quantity 
of supercooled 
water 
0,6 g/m3 and less 0,6 – 1,2 g/m3 1,2 g/m3 and more 
Average diameter 
of droplets 
50 µm and less 50 µm and more 
Nature of clouds 
and hydrometeors 
Stable Unstable Very unstable 
Freezing rain and 
drizzle 
Types of icing Hoar frost 
Rime ice 
Rime ice  
Mixed ice 
Clear ice 
Mixed ice 
Clear ice  
Glazed frost 
 
 
Table 3 - Effects of the icing in flight (M K Politovich, National Center for Atmospheric 
Research, 2003) 
Icing intensity Description 
Trace Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation is slightly greater 
than rate of sublimation. It is not hazardous even though de-
icing/anti-icing equipment is not utilized, unless encountered for an 
extended period of time (over 1 hour). 
Light The rate of accretion may create a problem if flight is prolonged in 
the environment (over 1 hour). Occasional use of de-icing/anti-icing 
equipment removes/prevents accretion. It does not present a 
problem if the de-icing/anti-icing equipment is used. In this case, 
change of heading or altitude is not necessary. 
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Icing intensity Description 
Moderate The rate of accretion is such that short encounters become 
potentially hazardous and use of de-icing/anti-icing equipment, or 
diversion, is necessary. The change of heading or altitude may be 
considered. 
Severe The rate of accretion is such that de-icing/anti-icing equipment fails 
to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate diversion, change of 
heading or altitude is necessary. 
 
The classification shown in the Table 3 is based on the effect of icing on the aircraft. The 
meteorologists use another way how to classify the icing severity as it´s presented in the 
Table 4. Of course, the meteorologists use also other weather information as LWC to identify 
the icing (e.g. temperature, movement of the air, information about cloud cover) 
Table 4  - Icing intensity classification in meteorology (Giuseppe Mingione (CIRA), 2000) 
Icing intensity LWCi [g/m3] 
Trace 0,1 and less 
Light 0,11 – 0,6 
Moderate 0,61 – 1,2 
Severe 1,2 and more 
An estimated quantity of the water content inside the clouds is visible in the Table 5.
i LWC Liquid Water Content 
                                                 
Table 5 – LWC in clouds (Giuseppe Mingione (CIRA), 2000) 
Cloud type / weather phenomena LWC [g/m3] 
Mist and fog 0,1 – 2 
Stable clouds 0,2 – 0,5 
Unstable clouds 0,5 – 5 
Unstable clouds in tropical regions  up to 16 
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1.4 Regulatory classification 
1.4.1 Aircraft certification 
In Europe, the requirements for heavy aircraft certification (over 5,7 tons of MTOW) are 
specified in CS 25 document. This regulation contains a specification of the atmospheric 
icing conditions and defines airframe ice accretion for the certification needs as it is shown 
in appendix C.  
Icing conditions are divided to 3 limiting types:  
1. Continuous maximum icing (stratiform clouds) 
2. Intermittent maximum icing (cumuliform clouds) 
3. Takeoff maximum icing 
Figure 5 – Continuous maximum (stratiform clouds) atmospheric icing conditions 
Liquid water content VS mean effective drop diameter (CS-25, 2012) 
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Each type of icing conditions is defined by multiple figures or values as variables of the 
cloud liquid water content, the mean effective diameter of the cloud droplets, the ambient 
air temperature. The interrelationship of these three variables is given as it´s shown in the 
figure below. The limiting icing envelope is defined in terms of altitude and temperature. 
Continuous maximum icing differs from Intermittent maximum icing mainly by the 
horizontal extent that is defined in the regulation. 
For example the takeoff maximum icing is defined by the cloud liquid water content of 0.35 
g/m3, the mean effective diameter of the cloud droplets of 20µm, and the ambient air 
temperature at ground level of minus 9 °C. CS 25 defines that the takeoff maximum icing 
conditions can extend from ground level to a height of 457 m (1500 ft) above the level of 
the takeoff surface. 
In order to pass certification tests, an aircraft must show the ability of safe flight with the 
most critical ice accretion in terms of airplane performance and handling qualities. Ice 
accretion are defined in the following categories based on a phase of the flight: 
a) Take-off Ice (from ground to 400 ft AAL) 
b) Final Take-off Ice (from 400 to 1500 ft AAL) 
c) En-route Ice 
d) Holding Ice 
e) Approach ice  
f) Landing ice 
The problem of CS 25 requirements specified in appendix C is that they don´t cover all types 
of icing. CS 25 doesn´t ensure a safe operation in presence of freezing precipitations with 
supercooled large droplets (droplets with diameter 50 µm or more), in case of ice crystals 
and mixed phased icing. 
1.4.2 Engine certification 
Requirements for engines certified to operate in icing conditions are specified in CS-E. CS-
E 780 says: “It must be established by tests, unless alternative appropriate evidence is 
available, that the Engine will function satisfactorily when operated in the atmospheric icing 
conditions of CS-Definitions without unacceptable: 
(1) Immediate or ultimate reduction of Engine performance, 
(2) Increase of Engine operating temperatures, 
(3) Deterioration of Engine handling characteristics, and 
(4) Mechanical damage.” (CS-E, 2015) 
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The capability of the engine to work in icing environment has to be proven in the most 
critical engine settings. The certification tests should take into account all the 
parts/equipment of the engine that could affect the air intake. Table below specifies the 
conditions of engine icing tests cycles. 
Table 6 - Engine icing tests cycles (CS-E, 2015)
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2 Identification of icing 
2.1 Identification by meteorologists 
Meteorologists identify the icing by evaluating an ice potential of the atmosphere. The ice 
potential is directly proportional to the total quantity of supercooled water, to the size and to 
the distribution of the water drops or of the droplets. It depends on the temperature and on 
the vertical movements of the air. It is not easy to forecast icing conditions because precise 
meteorological forecasting model doesn´t exist. The droplet size is not observed during 
meteorological observations. The quantity of the liquid water in the atmosphere is not 
forecasted. We don´t have information about vertical movements of the air in all the 
troposphere. We are able to identify and forecast the ice potential just based on a good 
knowledge of the physics of icing, radar data, satellite imagery and thanks to the numerical 
forecasts. An operational knowledge of the humidity, temperature and vertical movements 
are used in the ice potential evaluation. To determine the humidity, analysis of the cloudy 
saturated atmosphere is required. Big probability to find some supercooled water droplets or 
the precipitations exists in clouds. The temperature is another important factor when 
considering supercooled water droplets. A maximum density of supercooled water droplets 
is present near the temperature of 0 °C. That is the reason why the ice potential is maximal 
close to 0 °C isotherm. It is really rare to find present some liquid water below -40 °C. 
Generally we can say that ice potential decreases with increasing altitude. Vertical 
movements play a very important role too. Their task is to distribute the humidity from the 
lower parts of the troposphere to the upper parts. That´s why an unstable cloud with strong 
vertical movements has a bigger content of water than a stable cloud with much weaker 
vertical movements. When comparing a stable cloud and an unstable cloud with the same 
dimensions and the same temperature at the base of clouds, the unstable cloud contents five 
to ten times more condensed water than a stable cloud on average. The ice crystals naturally 
exist only below the temperature of -15 °C. The presence of ice crystals causes that the liquid 
water content decreases in a cloud. It means that as ice crystals develop, the water droplets 
disappear and ice potential is decreasing. That´s why recently developed Cumulus, which 
hasn´t reached an altitude where the temperature is -15 °C yet, has a higher ice potential than 
a well-developed Congestus in an altitude of 10 km.  
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In meteorology a few specific terms describing clouds and their content are used.  
Mixed cloud 
The mixed cloud contains both the supercooled water droplets as well as the ice crystals.  
Ice cloud 
Ice crystals dominate inside the ice cloud. 
Warm cloud 
A cloud where the temperature doesn´t drop below 0 °C is called a warm cloud. (Labyt, 
2008) 
2.2 Weather products used in icing identification 
2.2.1 Satellite and radar images 
Satellite and radar images can provide valuable help in identification of the icing areas. 
However, it is not possible to observe the icing while using the satellites and the radar data 
only. Even if the most modern radars can provide us with the information about the 
temperature of precipitation, it´s still complicated to forecast icing. The combination of 
various data about weather conditions (temperature, vertical movement of the air, humidity, 
forecasts…) are needed very often to be able to forecast icing potential. For example Swiss 
company specialized in short-term weather forecasts combines data from ground 
measurements of the temperature, humidity, precipitation with the satellite and the radar data 
to forecast the danger of  freezing rain.2 
Figure 6 – Superposition of radar echoes with the satellite image  
 
© (LABYT, 2008) 
 
                                                 
2 http://www.meteoradar.ch/pdf/181_abf_e_Schmid.pdf 
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Icing can be sometimes identified thanks to the rain bands that are displayed on the rainfall 
radar screens. We can see the superposition of radar echoes with the satellite image taken 
when the front was passing over the Northwest part of France in the Figure 6. It shows the 
areas of icing in long bands.  
In the other radar picture (Figure 7), it´s possible to identify the structures known as “scaled 
structures”. In these areas it´s very probable to find a maximum icing intensity. 
Figure 7 – “Scaled structures” in the radar picture 
 
© (LABYT, 2008) 
 
 
2.2.2 Forecasts, charts and reports 
The pilots use several types of meteorological products to stay informed about the weather 
conditions. A lot of them also contain the information about icing. For example AIRMETs 
reports are issued to inform about moderate icing and SIGMETs reports are published for 
the areas of severe ice formation outside of thunderstorms. The figure 8 below shows an 
example of SIGMET report with a warning that occasional severe icing can be encountered 
above expected freezing level. 
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Figure 8 - Example of SIGMET report 
 
PIREPs  issued by pilots in flight are used to confirm information about icing or to warn the 
other pilots about the icing conditions. When the PIREP exists, we can speak about “known 
icing”. It is always required from pilots to make a PIREP in case they observe the icing 
during a flight due to safety reasons. An example of PIREP report below warns about the 
light rime icing between 2 000 ft (610 m) and 4 000 ft (1 219 m) and about the light freezing 
rain in clouds. 
Figure 9 - Example of PIREP report 
 
The observed freezing level charts are provided to determine the altitude of 0 °C isotherm. 
The traditional way of measuring air data needed to publish these types of chart was a 
radiosonde. Nowadays an additional instruments such as measuring devices attached to the 
aircraft, satellites and weather radars are used to determine the actual freezing level.
 
DFWA UWS 051710 
SIGMET ALFA 1 VALID UNTIL 052110 
AR LA MS 
FROM MEM TO JAN 
OCNL SVR ICING ABV FRZLVL EXPCD. 
FRZLVL 080 E TO 120 W. 
CONDS CONTIG BYD 2100Z. 
UACN10 CYQT 192128 
YZ WG 
UA /OV YSP 090025 /TM 2120 /FL050 /TP BE99 /SK 020BKN040 110OVC /TA -14 
/WV 030045 /TB MDT CAT 060-080 /IC LGT RIME 020-040 /RM LGT FZRA INC 
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Figure 10 - Freezing level chart 
 
© Aviation Digital Data Service (ADDS) 3 
 
2.2.3 ACARS data usage 
Commercial airplanes provide over 130 000 meteorological observations per day nowadays, 
including measurements of the temperature, winds and in some cases the planes observe of 
the icing, humidity, vertical wind gusts or eddy dissipation rate (turbulence). (Moninger, 
2003) During the experiment called TAMDAR special sensors were installed on 63 Mesaba 
Airlines Saab 340 aircraft flying over the central and eastern United States and Canada. Real 
time weather data were collected during a climb, cruise flight and descent. Meteorologists 
on the ground tried to forecast icing in areas where pilot reports (PIREPS) were missing. 
(Mamrosh, 2003) 
ACARS is also used in the opposite direction of communication for sending the messages 
or data from the ground to the air. For example Air France dispatchers monitor the flights 
from the ground. In case of need, they can inform a crew about icing conditions expected on 
the route or they can directly re-plan their flight if it is necessary.
 
                                                 
3 http://www.aviationweather.gov/adds/icing/frzgnav 
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2.3 Identification by pilots 
Before a flight, pilot must study the meteorological conditions that will affect his flight. If 
there is a probability of icing conditions, he uses all the materials available from the 
paragraph above to plan the flight safely. 
2.3.1 Weather radar 
Weather radar is a big help for the pilots up in the air. Pilot needs some skills and the 
experience to well interpret what the radar shows. When operating the radar, pilot has the 
options to adjust the sensitivity of the receiver, the tilt of the radar beam, the range and the 
brightness of the display. Radar screen shows the colors and the shapes that have to be 
interpret.  
The main reason of radar presence on board is to enable the navigation of the pilots around 
the thunderstorms, to avoid dangerous turbulences and the icing as well. However, it is not 
in the capabilities of the radar to directly identify the icing.  Radars work on a principle of 
sending out the pulses of radio waves and then listening for those waves to bound back off 
the water droplets about the size of a raindrop.  
A hazard of overflying the storm is proportional to the concentration of water droplets. The 
correlation with a turbulent parts of storm is quite good. In addition, on some radar sets, it is 
possible to use Doppler signal processing to measure the movement of different areas of the 
water droplets within a storm for an additional indication of the turbulence. This option is 
generally available at short range (40 miles) only. 
The problem of radar is that it reflects poorly when liquid water is not present. It´s not able 
to reflect off the water vapor, the micro sized droplets that form majority of clouds and it 
reflects poorly ice crystals, ranging from the snowflakes to the hail stones. In the most cases 
the icing is caused by supercooled liquid water but in some special conditions the micro 
sized droplets or ice crystals can create really dangerous icing environment. 
Pilots have to consider many aspects when interpreting a weather radar, e.g. the intensity of 
the return (shown in colors), the gradient and shapes of the different intensities, blocking of 
returns by a complicated weather or the curvature of the earth and they have to differentiate 
between radar returns reflecting off the ground and the actual weather.  
There is no need to avoid all areas displayed on the radar screen. Sometimes it is even not 
possible. The pilots look at the intensity and the gradient of radar returns as well as at the 
shape of those returns in order to make a good decision about the state of the weather. At the 
cruising phase of flight, when thunderstorms are suspected, pilots must adjust the tilt of the 
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radar antenna beam down to look for the more reflective parts of the storm that may cause 
problem at their altitude. (PALMER, 2013) 
Figure 11 – On-board weather radar screen 
 
© Rockwell Collins4 
 
2.3.2 Ice detectors 
Visual inspection is a basic way how to check if there is no ice accretion on the airframe. 
Many airplanes used for the night flights are equipped with the ice formation spot lights 
mounted on an each side of the fuselage to light up the leading edges of the wings allowing 
visual examination for an ice formation. Sometimes it´s hard to see any other part of the 
airframe from the cockpit. For this case, there are the ice detectors that are used to verify 
that the ice accretion on the most vulnerable parts of the aircraft is acceptable. Otherwise use 
of de-icing/anti-icing equipment or escape from icing conditions are necessary. Several types 
of icing detectors exist and are used on board of the aircraft.  
 
2.3.2.1 Visual ice detectors 
Some systems make it easier to detect icing conditions by simply showing ice accretion on 
a special device in shape of an airfoil that is visible from the cockpit. When ice starts to 
adhere to the surface of the airfoil, heater can be switched on to de-ice the surface.  
                                                 
4 
https://www.rockwellcollins.com/sitecore/content/Data/Products/Radar_and_Surveillance/Weather_Radar/W
XR-2100_Weather_Radar_System.aspx 
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Figure 12 – Ice detector used on the ATR aircraft 
 
© Jan Tutaj5 
 
2.3.2.2 Smiths ice detector 
The other ice detectors can actively warn the flight crew about the icing conditions. Smiths 
ice detector is one of them. It is a tube attached to the aircraft, with holes in the leading and 
trailing edges. Pressure sensor is placed inside the tube. Flying in icing conditions causes 
that holes at the leading edge become blocked by ice and a negative pressure is created in 
the tube. This activates a relay unit and gives a warning to the crew. Accumulated ice can be 
dissipated using a heater element. 
2.3.2.3 Vibrating ice detector 
Some sensors use the variation of vibration frequency of the probe where ice built up to 
determine ice accretion. It´s a case of Rosemount ice detector. A mass of ice that builds up 
on the probe reduces its resonant frequency. When it falls below a predetermined value a 
warning is given. 
 
                                                 
5 http://www.pilotes-prives.fr/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=17099&start=30 
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Figure 13 – Patent schema of the vibration type detector  - Hughes concept 
 
© Hughes John Francis 6 
2.3.2.4 Napier ice detector 
Napier ice detector works on the principle of rotating shaft and knife edge cutter. When icing 
occurs, ice accumulates on the shaft that is flexibly mounted on the aircraft fuselage. The 
knife cutting the ice on the shaft causes a small rotation movement of the shaft in its 
mounting which activates the icing detectors. Depending on the system design this can 
directly initiate the anti-icing sequence. 
2.3.2.5 Sangamo Weston ice detector 
Ice can be detected by measuring a combination of the humidity and the temperature too. 
Sangamo Weston ice detector measures the humidity present in the air. When it determines 
a sufficient amount of water and freezing temperature, it activates an icing warning. In this 
case, icing conditions are detected rather than actual ice formation.  
 
                                                 
6 http://www.google.com/patents/US3541540?hl=en 
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2.3.2.6 Ice detectors using radiation 
Other types of detectors use an emission of small quantity of radioactive beta particles. If ice 
builds up on the detector, beta particles are absorbed by ice. A known difference between 
the amount of emitted and detected particles is proportional to the level of icing. (Oxford: 
Oxford Aviation Academy, 2001) 
 Figure 14 – Ice detection probes emitting beta particles   
 
© Wikimedia Common7 
                                                 
7https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%94%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%87%D0%B8%D0%BA_%D0
%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F.j
pg?uselang=ru 
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3 Influence of icing on flight operations 
Until now, we have looked on icing as on the meteorological issue mainly. But icing is 
influenced significantly by the aircraft, flight and aerodynamic characteristics of flight as 
well. 
A speed of the aircraft and its aerodynamic shape are very important factors in aircraft icing. 
They have important influence on the surface temperature of the airframe through 
aerodynamic heating. When we look at the wing section, the temperature of surface varies a 
lot as we move backwards from leading edge to trailing edge. It reaches the highest value at 
the impact point where a relative airflow speed is zero. As the airflow reaches the point of 
maximum thickness, the temperature of surface decreases to the minimal value. From that 
point, it restarts to increase until reaching the trailing edge. The difference of surface 
temperatures caused by aerodynamic heating can reach 27°C at 450 knots airspeed. For 
example, an aircraft flying at FL100, where standard air temperature is -5°C, cruising at 
Mach 0,6 will have the temperature of 12,8°C at the point of impact and the average 
temperature of the wing surface section will be 11°C.  
Another factor that determines the ice accretion is a trajectory of water droplets. The 
movement of the water particles is slightly different from the trajectory of relative airflow. 
The difference in trajectory depends mainly on the inertia of water droplets, on their speed 
and on the shape of the airfoil. 
Some parts of the airframe are more sensitive to the icing than the other parts. The most 
sensitive parts to the icing are the sharp components such as the leading edges of the wing, 
the empennage, the engine intakes, the propellers, the spinners, the antennas, probes, the 
windscreen wipers. The icing occurs easily on these components because boundary layers 
give only a little insulation between sharp skin and ice.8 It´s important to monitor these parts 
of the airframe as the ice accretion on these parts could be critical for all the aircraft. (Labyt, 
2008) 
3.1 Airframe icing 
3.1.1 Mass increase 
The quantity of an ice accretion depends on the type of icing. It ranges from less than 
1centimeter per hour, up to several centimeters in a few minutes in case of well-developed 
Cumulus type clouds, containing supercooled water droplets or freezing precipitations. This 
                                                 
8 http://www.caa.govt.nz/safety_info/gaps/aircraft_icing_handbook.pdf 
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can lead to an increase of several tons in aircraft mass during a short period of time. Variation 
of the mass caused by icing will have more significant effect on a light aircraft that has 
generally less excess of power then on a heavy aircraft type. Unexpected weight increment 
from the icing can have serious consequences on the aircraft flying close to maximum take-
off weight after departure. (Labyt, 2008) 
3.1.2 Modification of balance 
Ice deposits will not often be uniformly repartitioned across the airframe. This will modify 
a distribution of mass, CG position will be modified and finally it may cause a loss of 
stability. (Oxford: Oxford Aviation Academy, 2008) 
3.1.3 Aerodynamic effects 
The ice accumulates firstly on the leading edges of an airfoil. It disrupts the laminar air flow 
on the wing and significantly reduces a lift. This causes an increase of drag and reduction of 
the stall angle. Ice modifies the handling characteristics and the aircraft performance. 
Turbulent air flow can also cause small effectiveness of the control surfaces. In some special 
cases, when de-iced water re-freezes on the movable surfaces, mechanical jamming of the 
control surfaces, especially blockage of the slots, is possible. (Labyt, 2008) 
3.1.4 Problems with controls 
3.1.4.1.1 Wing stall 
Ice deposit on a wing affects the lift negatively. It decreases the critical angle of attack 
while drag and weight increase. 
Figure 15 – Lift curve showing the effect of the icing 
 (U.S.Federal Aviation Administration, 2008) 
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1mm thick layer of the ice on the wing is sufficient to change the wing lift-angle of attack 
curve. This leads to a smaller value of maximum lift coefficient and to a smaller stall angle 
value. The maximum value of the lift (on the lift coefficient/angle of attack curve) can be 
reduced by a half because of the ice accretion depending on the airfoil type. The 
controllability of the aircraft becomes worst at low speeds, close to the stall speed, when 
plane flies at high angle of attack. 
3.1.4.1.2 Roll upset 
One type of the problems with the controls caused by severe inflight icing are known as roll 
upset. It is an uncommanded and uncontrolled roll phenomena. Every pilot should be aware 
that severe icing is a condition that is out of the airplane’s certification icing envelope, even 
if pilot is flying with an aircraft certified for flight in known icing conditions.  
Ice ridge, which builds up on an unprotected surface of the wing, disrupts laminar flow of 
the air. Airflow separation on the wing induces self-deflection of the ailerons and degraded 
roll handling characteristics. The problems with the controls can start unexpectedly without 
the usual symptoms of ice accumulation. 
3.1.4.1.3 Empennage stall 
The second problem with the controls caused by icing is the empennage stall. As the tail 
plane accumulates ice faster than the wing and as it is outside the view of the pilot, the crew 
is unaware of the situation until the stall occurs. When the ice deposit on the tail plane 
becomes excessive and the horizontal stabilizer reaches critical value of angle of attack the 
tail plane stall occurs. Natural nose down tendency produced by the center of lift of the main 
wing will not be compensated by tail plane any more. The plane will react by pitching down 
uncontrollably. The biggest problem of the tail plane stall is a relatively high airspeed at the 
onset. Unfortunately, it is favorable to happen in low altitudes before landing. In this phase 
of the flight, the flaps are in extended position what increases pitching moment of the 
aircraft.9 (CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEW ZEALAND , 2000)  
  
                                                 
9 http://www.caa.govt.nz/safety_info/gaps/aircraft_icing_handbook.pdf 
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3.2 Instruments icing 
3.2.1 Probes icing 
Following the accident of Air France Flight 272 in July 1961, caused by the Pitot tube icing, 
the pressure probes on the passenger aircraft are now heated during all the flight. Without 
the heating, the pitot tubes can be very easily blocked by the ice, even in light icing 
conditions. In this case, they will not show a real airspeed of the aircraft and all pressure 
measuring instruments of the aircraft will not work properly. It can be very confusing for the 
crew. It is proven by the fatal accident of A330 in 2009. A lot of planes are equipped with 
de-icing of static pressure probes as well. 
In jet engines, pressure probes are used to determine Engine Pressure Ratio that corresponds 
to the engine thrust settings. These probes are situated in the compressor inlet where they 
can become blocked by the ice. The pilots, who do not know that engine inlet pressure probes 
are blocked by the ice, will reduce the thrust and they can approach the stall speed because 
of an incorrect instrument data reading. Very similar situation happens with the Engine Inlet 
Temperature sensors which can be also blocked by the icing. These problems could cause 
operation difficulties and sometimes they lead to inappropriate power settings. 
3.2.2 Antennas icing 
A sharp shape and the position of the antennas makes them very vulnerable to the ice 
formation. Antennas must be equipped with anti-icing protection to do not disturb the radio 
communication. Antenna can starts to vibrate in case of ice accretion on it. Sometimes it 
leads to breaking up the antenna. The communication is impossible without the antenna and 
there exists a danger of damage of some other aircraft parts by hitting when it breaks. 
3.2.3 Angle of attack indicators icing 
Some commercial aircraft types, as for example late models of Boeing 737, 767 or 777, are 
equipped with the angle of attack indicators. They provide the indication of a green approach 
band which represents the normal range of the angle of attack for approach. (PALMER, 
2013) As the indicators protrudes from the nose of the aircraft, the ice can easily builds on 
them. Without any electric heating, the indications of the angle of attack indicators would 
not be reliable. 
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3.3 Propulsion system icing 
3.3.1 Engine icing 
The ice can accrete on the engine intakes and on the fan blades following the same principle 
as on the wing. The ice deposits on the engine intakes disrupt an airstream and degrade the 
thrust. When the ice formation is excessive or if the de-icing of the engine inlet is operated 
improperly, big ice blocks can be ingested by the engine. This can damage the blades of the 
compressor or it could lead to the engine flame-out and sometimes to the explosion of the 
engine. 
It happens that the ice builds up on the fan blades after start-up of the engine, whilst it is 
running at low thrust for a longer period of time. In this case the prescribed engine handling 
procedures may be used to remove the ice from the blades.  
Ice crystals often present a high risk for a safe run of the jet engine. The principle of the ice 
crystals accretion in the engine is not completely understood. It seems that the ice crystals 
which enter the engine start to melt on the surfaces of the compressor. The melted ice creates 
a liquid film that captures other ice crystals. Heat is removed from the compressor until the 
liquid film starts to freeze inside the engine. The ice layer can easily shed from the 
compressor parts. It results in the engine instability such as a surge, a flameout, or an engine 
damage. (Duvivier, 2010) 
Figure 16 – Cross-section of the turbo-fan jet engine and the potential icing accretion area 
10 
                                                 
10© (Duvivier, 2010) 
https://easa.europa.eu/conferences/iascc/doc/Workshop%201%20Presentations/Workshop1_DAY%202/1_D
uvivier_EASA/IASCC_E%20Duvivier.pdf 
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3.3.2 Propeller icing 
The propellers are the parts of the aircraft, which are significantly exposed to the effects of 
the icing. They have to be protected in case of flying into the icing conditions. With a fixed 
blade propeller, a drop in the RPM is often a sign that the ice starts to build up. When using 
a constant speed propeller, the presence of the icing is revealed by observing the manifold 
pressure reduction. The propeller will start to vibrate because of the ice sometimes. The 
severe icing can cause a destruction of the propeller. To overcome it, the anti-icing systems 
are mounted on the propeller. Some of them are electric but a chemical principle is used very 
often. The tips of the blades are normally not protected against ice. Ice shades naturally from 
there because of the centrifugal force. A first sign of the ice accumulation on the propeller 
is observed on the propeller spinner that must be de/anti-iced too. 
3.4 Windscreen icing 
In case of an IFR flight in a cruising level, you don´t need to watch out through the window 
frequently. When landing, it can be necessary to have a visual reference with the ground and 
the obstacles. The ice formation on the windscreen is nothing uncommon during the winter 
operations in Europe. The airliners are prepared for it. Their windscreen are composed from 
the multiple layers. One of the layers contains electrically heated metal, used to de-ice the 
windows. The advantage of this type of anti-ice equipment is that it keeps all the windscreen 
without the ice. The pilots of smaller planes that are not equipped with this type of 
windscreens, must watch out from the cockpit through a small rectangle that is de-iced by 
electricity, hot air or by other means. 
Figure 17 – Anti-icing plate on the Cessna´s windshield 
11 
                                                 
11 Kevin G. Mackenzie © 2002-2005, http://www.337skymaster.com/arlington2004/dirkp337/index.htm 
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4 Areas representing the highest risk for flight operations 
4.1 Areas under influence of front passage 
The dangerous phenomena for the flight appears in a presence of the cold front but the warm 
front complicates the weather situation even more. 
4.1.1 Influence of Cold front 
Cold front is a barrier that separates two different air masses. The warmer air is being 
replaced by the colder air. The colder air has bigger density than the warmer air and it pushes 
up the warmer air to the higher altitudes. Two different air masses exist one over the other, 
separated by the front line. This state is perfect for the icing formation. Precipitations that 
are formed in the warmer air, in form of the rain, fall to the colder air. If the colder air has a 
temperature below 0 °C, freezing rain occurs. Rain drop that condenses in the warm sector, 
falls to the cold air. Freezing air cools the water droplet. When it falls on the ground or on 
an aircraft in flight, it breaks, spreads out and forms clear ice. In these conditions severe 
icing is very probable. Ice accumulates so quickly that almost every aviation industry 
manufacturer advises that none of its products, even those certified for known icing, are 
design to fly in the freezing rain. 
Figure 18 – Icing conditions near fronts 
 
© (LABYT, 2008)  
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4.1.2 Influence of Warm front 
Similar situation as we have seen at the cold front area happens with the warm front passage. 
In this case the warmer air is replacing the colder air. It means that the warmer air will climb 
above the colder one that has bigger air density. A 0 °C isotherm increases its altitude. The 
air temperature increases first at higher altitudes as the front passes. If a temperature of the 
colder air is negative, the freezing rain forms again. In case of the warm fronts, the areas 
under the influence of the freezing rain is much wider in comparison with the cold front. The 
freezing rain forms only in case that rain drops are falling on a short distance threw the colder 
air (with the negative temperatures). Otherwise, water is transformed into ice and drops 
become ice pellets.  It is a night mare of every pilot to cross this type of weather during the 
flight.  
4.2 Flight into supercooled precipitations 
In the winter, mainly in some mountainous regions, it happens that the warm air arrives in 
the upper parts of the troposphere but the cold freezing air is blocked in the valleys (because 
of the orographic blocking). There exists a big probability of glazed frost formation on an 
aircraft flying in a valley when the precipitations form in this area. Glazed frost represents a 
severe icing conditions with a serious hazard for the aviation activity. 
4.3 Inversion in an altitude 
Strong temperature inversion in the altitude of a few thousand feet or the wind shear can 
block all the updrafts in the air. The water lifted up from the ground to the inversion layer 
starts to accumulate near the top parts of the inversion. If this phenomena takes places in a 
higher altitude, where the temperature drops under 0 °C, the probability of the icing is quite 
high. Statocumulus clouds imply the presence of the temperature inversion very often. 
Closer to the top of Stratocumulus we are flying, higher icing severity is possible. 
4.4 Orographic lifting 
The glider pilots could speak about the power of wave flying. The wind is deflected to the 
high altitudes thanks to the mountains. In the mountains, an air mass contains a big amount 
of the humidity. This humidity is transported to a high troposphere by an orographic lifting. 
It results in the formation of the clouds above the mountains. These clouds contain 
supercooled water. It represents the potential icing conditions in combination with the cold 
air. 
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4.5 Influence of the seasons 
In the winter, the weather can be characterized by more active disturbances, lower 
temperatures and higher thermal contrasts. All these factors increase the ice potential. In 
Western Europe an influence of the air masses, situated above the ocean that are different 
from a continental air mass, plays an important role. The circulation of the water is affected 
by a presence of these two different air masses. The consequences are most visible in the 
autumn. In this season, the sun has much less power to warm the ground and consequently 
the air above the continent. The ocean and the water inside has higher thermal capacity than 
the air. The water becomes warmer than the air coming from the continent. This leads to  
the water evaporation, humidity increase in the air and it indicates that icing can occur. 
(Labyt, 2008) 
4.6 Foggy areas 
The fog is quite often a problematic issue because of the poor visibility in aviation. In  
the winter, a temperature of the air in the fog sometimes drops under 0 °C. In this case, we 
speak about the freezing fog.  
As the land cools under the clear skies overnight, it easily loses its temperature. When the 
air temperature decreases, the ability of the land to preserve humidity decreases as well. 
That´s why the fog is created. In the winter, the land can radiate as much heat that it starts to 
freeze. Water exists in the state of supercooled water droplets until it hits some surface or 
the ground. Rime ice with light to moderate intensity can be expected. Very low freezing 
temperatures can sometimes lead to severe icing conditions. 
4.7 Cold high pressure areas 
The presence of clouds is not always necessary for the icing formation. The high pressure 
situation in presence of the cold air is very similar to the freezing fog described in the 
previous paragraph. There is only one important difference. In this case, the air doesn´t 
contain enough moisture to create the fog. It makes the icing conditions less obvious than in 
the case of freezing fog. That´s why a strict pre-flight check is important in this case. The 
severity of icing is lower in comparison with the freezing fog. During a clear sky night, with 
no wind, the hoar frost forms on the airframe of the aircraft. Generally it has an influence on 
the aircraft parked on the ground only. Although the hoar frost forms on the planes in flight, 
in slightly different conditions too. For example, an aircraft performing fast climb from the 
areas with freezing air temperatures to the areas with warmer but moister air, can often 
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encounter hoar frost formation on the frozen airframe surfaces. It works the same way when 
descending from the freezing air to a lower altitude where the warmer air contains more 
moisture again. 
4.8 Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone is an area of a significant weather that circles the globe 
near the equator. An exact position varies with the longitude and the season. It moves slightly 
south of the equator in the southern-latitude summer, and slightly north in the northern-
latitude summer. This zone is well known for pilots because of massive thunderstorm 
development. The biggest difference between Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
thunderstorms and conventional land-mass thunderstorms is in a principal of formation. 
Usually the thunderstorms are created by frontal actions or by convection. The Inter-Tropical 
Convergence Zone thunderstorms are formed differently. They are driven by the global 
circulation patterns with warm moist air coming from the equatorial region. Easterly trade 
winds (steady, persistent winds blowing on the Equatorial side of the subtropical high 
pressure systems in both hemispheres12) of the Northern and Southern hemispheres converge 
near the equator, providing the lifting action required to create a storm. This leads to the 
cloud formation. The strongest thunderstorms formed in this zone occur above the land areas 
in the afternoon. In equatorial region, the air temperature is high. A tropopause, the 
atmospheric layer separating the troposphere and the stratosphere, will be therefore located 
in much higher altitudes (15 km – 18 km) than in polar or mid-latitude regions (9 km – 12 
km). Only one thing can stop the vertical development of Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
thunderstorms. It is a change of lapse rate of the temperature in tropopause. Tropopause 
creates the ceiling where an anvil head appears on many thunderstorms, as they can´t grow 
any higher. Cumulonimbus tops at the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone reach sometimes 
more than 15 000 m altitude. It´s impossible to overfly them in common commercial aircraft. 
Finally, a problem with Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone for pilots is that the thunderstorm 
clouds formed in this zone show up poorly on weather radar. At night, thunderstorms are 
very easily recognizable by lightning but Cumulonimbus clouds produce less lightning in 
this area than in other regions, what masks their activity. (PALMER, 2013) 
                                                 
12 http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Trade_Winds 
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4.9 Icing conditions at high altitudes 
Although the previous parts of the thesis state that icing has the biggest probability to occur 
in the lower altitudes, near 0 °C isotherm, there exists the possibility of ice crystals icing in 
the upper troposphere. This type of icing was not seen as a real hazard for aircraft until the 
accidents happened. Air France flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris is an example. The 
most vulnerable parts of the plane threatened by the ice crystals are the engines and the 
probes. A certain number of thrust fluctuations and probe blockages in high convection 
zones have been noted in service, pointing the finger at the ice crystals. Unlike classic icing, 
detectable by the crew, the ice crystals icing is untraceable. There exists the reserves in 
understanding physical and accretion phenomena in high altitudes and at low temperatures. 
(Duvivier, 2011) 
It is a serious hazard for the flight safety to lose thrust of the engine because of an ingestion 
of the ice crystals. During the flight, the airplanes can often cross the clouds where the ice 
crystals concentration is over 2 g/m3. As it can´t be predicted by radar use, it is complicated 
to avoid this weather hazard. More than 100 events were classified as ice ingestion incidents 
or accidents between years 1990 and 2004 . A BAe 146 flying through severe ice crystals 
icing totally lost the engine thrust in 1990s. Honeywell, the manufacturer of the engines of 
BAe 146, was forced to change the construction of the engine. Crystals icing effect on the 
engines is more complex than the effect on the probes. Ice formation on the parts of the 
compressor can alter thrust. The engine can stall when ice passes into the combustion 
chamber. 
Even if the radars are not able to identify small ice particles, there exists other signs that 
could help to reveal their presence: 
 Inaccurate indication of temperature caused by ice melting and refreezing in probes 
 Traces of water (melted ice crystals) on the windscreen 
 Noise of ice crystals hitting the airframe 
The problem with ice crystal icing is that our knowledge about it is not sufficient. We don´t 
have enough precise data about the volume of ice crystals in the upper troposphere. The 
researches that were made in the 1950s tell about values of up to 8 g/m3. More recent 
measurements found the smaller values of 3 g/m3. In addition, it is a big difference between 
convective activity over oceans and continents. The quantity of ice crystals depends a lot on 
the strength of vertical movements that is a result of the convection.  
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That´s why the new tests were carried out by Airbus in Darwin in February 2010 and in 
Cayenne in May 2010. Results showed a big variation of ice water content in high altitudes 
that reached the maximum value of 6 – 7 g/m3. Other tests organized by FAA, NASA, and 
Boeing were planned in Darwin in 2013. New information discovered during these 
campaigns should be included in crew training by fastest possible way. The development of 
space technology gives the possibility to improve detection capability in the future. (Strapp, 
2011) 
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5 Safety analysis of icing in flight 
The first part of this chapter will summarize the last major safety events which happened 
during the flights of commercial aircraft and that have something in common with the icing. 
The information contained in this part of the work will be based on the investigation reports 
published by the official investigative authorities. Each accident/incident report will be 
completed by a table summarizing effect of the icing on the occurrence. In this table, I will 
try to define related hazards, trace the consequences of these hazards and evaluate the 
existing barriers. To assess a risk of the hazard related consequences, the safety risk index 
will be assigned to each occurrence, as it is defined in ICAO Doc 9859 - Safety Management 
Manual. This index is an alphanumeric designator, which contains information about the 
probability and the severity of the consequence related to the hazard. In each case, the most 
suitable value from the Table 7 will be chosen to approximate the likelihood or the estimated 
frequency of the safety occurrence. 
Table 7 - Safety risk probability  
(Safety Management Manual (SMM), 2013) 
 
 
The values/characters form the Table 8 will be used to characterize the severity of each 
occurrence. The severity index will be assigned upon the correlation between the description 
of the severity index (column “Meaning” in the Table8) and the outcome of an analyzed 
hazard. 
In the next chapter I will try to make a summary of all the occurrences presented in this 
chapter. The aim of the safety analysis will be to propose further actions to enhance the 
safety level. 
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Table 8 - Safety risk severity 
(Safety Management Manual (SMM), 2013) 
 
5.1 Major accidents/incidents caused by icing in flight 
5.1.1 Clear ice accretion, ATR 72 (AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, 1996) 
 Date: 31 October 1994 
 Operator: American Eagle 
 Registration: N401AM 
 Location: near Roselawn, Indiana (United States of America) 
 Type of occurrence: Fatal accident 
 
On Monday, October 31, 1994 in the afternoon an ATR 72-212 operated by Simmons 
Airlines on behalf of American Eagle began a descent to Chicago O'Hare International 
Airport. There were two pilots, two flight attendants, one made its first flight and 64 
passengers on board. 
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Shortly after the take-off, when the aircraft passed 1,800 feet, the pilot engaged the autopilot 
and continued climb to the cruising flight level FL160. On the frequency, several pilots were 
reporting moderate icing in the lower flight levels. 
The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL 100 and then the crew started holding procedure. 
While descending, the pilots turned on de-icing on maximum and increased NP to 86% to 
fulfil the criteria for flight in icing conditions. When the plane reached FL 100, the pilots 
reduced de-icing to level 1 and they set the throttle to 77%.  After 10 minutes, the captain 
was not satisfied with a big pitch angle in the holding pattern turns. The FO set the flaps to 
15 degrees to lower the angle of attack. In this moment the plane was flying through the 
areas of large supercooled drizzle/rain drops. Approximately 7 minutes after that, de-icing 
was reset to level 3 and the throttle was increased to 86% again.13 
After a few minutes, the ATR was cleared to descend to 8 000 ft in holding, and pilots were 
informed that they can expect approach in 10 minutes. It was the last radio contact between 
the ATC and the plane. 
The pilots retracted the flaps during the descent but the autopilot was still engaged. This fact 
was very important because while descending, aerodynamic performance of the aircraft got 
significantly worse. If the pilots had been flying manually, they would have had bigger 
chance to realise the problems. Increase in the angle of attack and excessive flight control 
deflections reflected the autopilot´s effort to stabilize the plane. Suddenly, the autopilot 
reached its limits and it disengaged. In this moment the crew started a fight with the flight 
controls. The ATR got into unusual flight positions and the pilots were not able to get the 
plane under control any more. The ATR crashed into field located about 60 NM from their 
destination.14 
The critical reason of the accident was an ice accretion aft of the deice boots on the wings. 
This caused an inconvenient airflow around the ailerons and subsequent aileron hinge 
moment reversals. The ailerons abruptly deflected to a right-wing-down position due to this 
reason. The pilots tried to stabilize the flight. Unfortunately they didn´t find the way how to 
overcome the repeating rolling effect of the flight controls. 
                                                 
13 http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1996/AAR9601.pdf 
14 http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1996/AAR9602.pdf 
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The ATR 72 encountered a mixture of rime and clear airframe icing in supercooled cloud 
and drizzle/rain drops. Some drops were estimated to be bigger than 100 µm in diameter, 
and some were as large as 2,000 µm.15 
The accident near Roselawn resulted in big research in influence of supercooled large 
droplets on the flight safety and on the aircraft certification requirements concerning icing 
conditions. 
The problems with the control of the ATR aircraft repeated also in 1998. The ATR 42 flying 
from Dresden to Posen (Poland) had nearly the same problems as the crew of the ATR 72 
near Roselawn. The aircraft was climbing to the cruise level FL 190 through the layer of 
stratiform clouds with a presence of the precipitations. They encountered moderate to severe 
icing (the crew identified the level of icing as light to moderate). The pilots turned on anti-
icing and de-icing equipment. As they were climbing, the rate of climb decreased first to 500 
ft/min and subsequently to 200-300 ft/min. At this moment, the pilots decided to level off at 
FL135 to increase an airspeed which dropped from 160 kt (in the beginning of the climb) to 
155 kt. Suddenly the stall warning was activated, an autopilot disengaged and the aircraft 
uncontrollably rolled to the left and to the right several times. Pilots had the problems to 
stabilize the aircraft and they declared an emergency to the ATCii. Fortunately, in contrast 
with the accident near Roselawn, this flight could be classified as an incident and it finished 
by precautionary landing at Berlin-Schönefeld airport.16
ii ATC Air Traffic Control 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reconsiderations/AAR9601r.pdf 
16http://www.bfu-web.de/EN/Publications/Investigation%20Report/1998/Report_98_5X011-
0_Cottbus_ATR42.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
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5.1.1.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 9 - Clear ice accretion, ATR 72 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to 
control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
Approach 
/holding in 
an area of 
supercooled 
precipitations 
Severe rime 
and clear 
airframe icing 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance 
– roll upset, 
stall 
De-icing 
boots 
4A 
 
5.1.2 Wing stall, Cessna Citation V Ultra C560 U (Muller, 1997) 
 Date: 2 January 1996 
 Operator: Contrails Ltd. 
 Registration: VP - BQB 
 Location: near Augsburg, Bavaria (Germany) 
 Type of occurrence: Accident 
The Cessna C560 with two flight crew members and three businessmen on board took-off 
from Lugano airport to Augsburg at 17:00. The aircraft was established on the ILS of a 
runway at Augsburg airport and it was prepared for the precision approach landing with 
autopilot engaged at 17:30.  
The weather conditions in Augsburg were not ideal. The area was covered by high fog. The 
wind was calm. The visibility was about 2 000 m. The cloud base had the altitude of 500 ft 
AGLiii only. There was a big probability of icing from the ground up to a height of 5 000 ft. 
Pilots that landed at the airport 2 hours later after the accident reported unusual heavy icing 
during the approach. The crew of the C560 evaluated the icing level as light using an ice 
detection equipment. A passenger who was watching the leading edge of the aircraft 
witnessed that there was a layer of ice approximately 1 cm thick on the wing. Investigators 
of the accident found an ice deposit about 2 mm thick which spread 30 cm back along the 
lower surface of the wing.  
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The approach speed of 105 kt was calculated before the flight and it was maintained during 
the approach. At an approximate altitude of 330 ft the pilots got visual reference with the 
ground, they disengaged the autopilot and controlled the aircraft manually. The airplane flew 
slightly under the correct approach path because the pilots wanted to touch –down right at 
the beginning of the runway which was 1 250 m long. Suddenly, when the aircraft passed 
the height of 50 m it stalled on the right wing. The pilot flying reacted by setting a full thrust. 
The aircraft than banked to the left side and hit the ground with the wing. The first contact 
of the airplane with the ground was at the distance of about 130 m in front of the threshold 
of runway. The C560 stopped after approximately 230 m of run, between the runway and a 
taxiway. One of the passengers suffered minor injuries. The aircraft was seriously damaged. 
The crew members were appropriately qualified and certified for flying with the C560. Both 
of them had more than 2 000 flight hours. They were well rested and prepared to perform 
the flight. 
The Cessna 560 had only 200 hours of total flight time. It was registered at the Bermuda 
Islands. Position of CG was within the prescribed limits during the flight. 
The investigation discovered that even if the aircraft was flown as prescribed in the flight 
manual, with anti-icing and de-icing devices on, it stalled at higher than expected stall speed. 
It means that the wing icing modified the aircraft normal characteristics and made it more 
susceptible to stall without any warning. 
Cessna Company carried out the tests of this aircraft to examine the flight parameters during 
the flight at minimum airspeed in icing conditions because several similar occurrences had 
happened in flight with C560. These tests proved unstable flight characteristics in icing well 
above published stalling speeds.  The ADivwas issued as a reaction on the findings of Cessna 
Company. The manuals of the aircraft were changed to prevent the danger situations.17
iiiAGL About Ground Level  
iv AD Airworthiness Directive 
                                                 
17http://www.bfu-web.de/EN/Publications/Investigation%20Report/1996/Report_96_CX001-
0.pdf?__blob=publicationFile  
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5.1.2.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 10 - Wing stall, Cessna Citation V Ultra C560 U 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
Precision 
approach in 
freezing fog 
Wing icing - 
clear ice 
Stall Operational 
procedures 
3B 
 
5.1.3 Stall caused by icing, Embraer 120RT Brasilia (AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 
REPORT, 1998) 
 Date: 9 January 1997 
 Operator: COMAIR Airlines 
 Registration: N265CA 
 Location: near Monroe, Michigan (United States of America) 
 Type of occurrence: Fatal Accident 
Flight 3272 was a regular domestic flight from Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International 
Airport to Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport operated by COMAIR Airlines. 2 
flight crew members, 1 flight attendant, and 26 passengers were on board. The Embraer 120 
took-off from Convington at 15:09. Departure was in delay of about 30 minutes, because the 
plane required servicing and the weather conditions (light snow) required airframe deicing 
before takeoff.  
The flight continued without any significant problems until the approach phase. At 15:38, 
captain advised the flight attendant that the flight from Covington to Detroit would take 
“only forty minutes today.” That time, the crew got permission from ATC to descend for 
approach to Detroit. The pilots listened to Detroit’s ATIS which informed about visibility of 
1 mile in light snow and it warned off the poor braking action. During the descent the 
Embraer was vectored for spacing. As the plane was descending, the pilots completed the 
descent checklist that included an ice protection prompt. Although the crew didn´t notice 
any signs of icing, they activated the windshield heating and the propeller de-ice system as 
it is recommended in the aircraft operational manual. The pilot didn´t use leading edge 
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deicing boots. At 15:52, the pilots were cleared to descend to 4 000 ft. As there was another 
faster airplane (A320) approaching Detroit, the Embraer was requested to reduce speed. The 
A320 got the warning about wind shear, tailwinds aloft from ATC and the crew reported 
“slick runways and low visibility.” At 15: 53 the Embraer was vectored to intercept the 
localizer by making a left turn to heading 090°. At this moment aircraft started to bank 
uncontrollably and when the bank angle exceeded the value of 45° the autopilot 
disconnected. The speed was slowly reducing when the bank angle increased to 140° and 
the pitch attitude decreased from nearly 2° nose up to about 17° nose down. At 15:54 the 
ground proximity warning system (GPWS) was activated and it announced “bank angle” 
aural warning. A few seconds after that, the aircraft hit the ground in a steep nose-down 
attitude in a field located about 19 nm southwest of Detroit airport. 
The crew consisted of experienced airline transport pilot rated captain. He had accumulated 
5 329 total flight hours, including about 1 097 hours as pilot-in-command in the Embraer 
120. First officer held a commercial pilot license. The day of accident, his total flight time 
was 2 582 flight hours, including 1 494 hours as first officer in the Embraer 120. Both pilots 
obtained all necessary ratings to fly with the Embraer 120. The crew was well rested before 
the flight and all the members of the crew were properly certified for the flight. 
The problems of the Embraer 120 coping with the icing had been known even before the 
flight. After the ATR accident near Roselawn, the FAAv conducted a review of in-service 
accidents and incidents involving roll axis control events in icing conditions and identified 
about 50 events, including the 6 Embraer 120 events. 
Flight 3272 took place in winter season. The temperature at cruising altitude of 21 000 ft 
MSL viwas far below 0 °C during all the cruising phase of the flight. That´s why the 
probability of icing formation in these conditions was minor and the aircraft started to 
descend without any ice deposit on the airframe. As the plane was approaching Detroit, 
meteorological conditions started to deteriorate. Data from meteorological center and radar 
images show the evidence of icing conditions in the clouds along the accident airplane’s 
descent path below 11,000 feet MSL with the highest intensity between 4,100 feet MSL and 
3,900 feet MSL. The pilots that were overflying the same region at the time of the accident 
reported varying no-ice to severe rime icing conditions. It means that the icing conditions 
near the accident site were very variable. There was a probability of formation of rime or 
mixed ice at various altitudes and in various amounts, rates, and types of accumulation. If 
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supercooled large droplet icing conditions were present, the droplet sizes probably did not 
exceed 400 microns and most likely existed near 4,000 feet MSL. 
It seems that as the Embraer was descending through the layer of clouds, it accumulated a 
thin, rough glaze/mixed ice coverage on the leading edge deicing boot surfaces, possibly 
with ice ridge formation on the leading edge upper surface. This thin layer of ice was 
unidentified by the pilots and the de-icing boots were not activated. As the ice accreted 
asymmetrically on the wings, the aircraft gained a left roll tendency. The crew didn´t identify 
it, until the autopilot disengaged. The flight characteristics, the critical angle of attack and 
the stall speed changed because of the ice deposit on the wings. The pilots unaware about 
this, were not able to recognize the dangerous situation and they did not succeeded to recover 
from unusual aircraft attitude. 18
v FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
vi MSL Mean Sea Level 
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Table 11 - Stall caused by icing, Embraer 120RT Brasilia 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
Descent 
through the 
layer of 
clouds 
Wing icing - 
glaze/mixed 
ice 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance 
– roll upset 
De-icing 
boots 
4A 
 
5.1.4 Frost accumulation, Cessna 208 Caravan Amphibian (Aviation Investigation 
Report A99P0181, 2001) 
 Date: 28 December 1999 
 Operator: Seair 
 Registration: C-FGGG 
                                                 
18 http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1998/AAR9804_body.pdf 
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 Location: near Abbotsford Airport, British Columbia (Canada) 
 Type of occurrence: Accident 
Cessna 208 was involved in 26 icing related accidents or incidents between years 1987 and 
2003. In 15 of 26 occurrences, the ice accumulated in-flight, in 10 cases it accumulated 
during approach and landing phases. The other 10 accidents happened because the ice was 
not removed from the airframe before the take-off.19 
The flight of the Seair Cessna 208 was a private flight from Abbotsford Airport to the 
Bahamas. It was a single pilot flight and five passengers were on board.  
The morning when accident happened, Abbotsford Airport was under influence of high 
pressure area, that leaded to the formation of fog and low visibility in stratus clouds. 
Vancouver International Airport, about 34 miles west of Abbotsford, was reporting freezing 
fog throughout the morning.20 The morning METARvii issued for Abbotsford Airport 
contained warning about frost indication in the remarks.  
The pilot had accumulated over 12 000 hours of flying time, with experience on float-
equipped aircraft, such as the DHC-2 Beaver and DHC-2T Turbo Beaver until the accident. 
He had recently completed type rating on the Cessna 208 and he had about 85 hours of 
experience on this type of aircraft. However there is no evidence that he passed some training 
to get the qualification for the aircraft in the amphibious configuration. 16  
The Cessna 208 was parked outside overnight before the flight and a layer of frost had 
accumulated on the airframe. In the morning, the pilot used tap water to remove frost from 
the windshield in order to see out of the aircraft. It´s obvious he knew that the airframe was 
covered by the frost but he assessed that it couldn´t influence the safety of the flight. He 
believed that the sun would melt the ice. But as the temperature was below 0 °C until the 
take-off, it did not happen.  
The pilot studied the meteorological situation, he filed a VFR flight plan and he was ready 
for take-off at 9:16. He took-off using 20° flaps settings. He retracted the flaps in two steps 
during the climb. First from 20° to 10° and then from 10° to 0°. When the flaps were fully 
retracted, the pilot started to have the problems with control. The aircraft rolled to the left 
and descended rapidly. The pilot first succeed to stabilize the flight by pushing the controls 
and by applying the full throttle. The effect of this maneuver was that the aircraft started to 
                                                 
19 https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/speeches/weener/weener_020111.pdf 
20 http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1999/a99p0181/a99p0181.asp 
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descend. However the plane didn´t have enough altitude and it hit the ground about one 
minute after the take-off. As the aircraft was equipped with the floats, they absorbed an 
important portion of energy accumulated during the impact and there were no fatalities. 
The final report of the accident investigation states that the main reason of the accident was 
the frost that wasn´t removed from the surface of aircraft before the flight. That day, many 
pilots cancelled or postponed their flights because of the weather. Some airplanes on the 
ramp were covered by ice until late that morning. The Cessna stalled at lower than normal 
stall speed because of the ice deposit on the wings. Another factor that negatively affected 
the stall speed was that the Maximum Take-off Weight of the aircraft was exceeded by more 
than 230 kg. The reduction of the lift caused by flaps retraction leaded to the stall and to the 
destruction of the plane.
vii METAR Meteorological Aerodrome Report 
                                                 
5.1.4.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 12 - Frost accumulation, Cessna 208 Caravan Amphibian 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Preflight-
check 
Condition of 
the surface 
of an aircraft 
Frost deposit 
on the 
airframe 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance 
– MTOW 
exceeded, 
stall 
Ground 
de-icing 
4B 
 
5.1.5 Engine flame-out, Shorts SD3-60 (Final Report of the Investigation Committee 
of the Libyan Civil Aviation Authorities, 2001) 
 Date: 13 January 2000 
 Operator: Avisto Ltd. (operating for Sirte Oil Company)  
 Registration: HB-AAM 
 Location: near Marsa el-Brega (Libya) 
 Type of occurrence: Fatal accident 
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The accident happened on the flight from Tripoli to Marse el-Brega, while approaching 
Marsa el-Brega airport. The Shorts SD3-60 was used by Sirte Oil Company, a state-owned 
Lybian oil and gas Company, to transport workers and their families. Oil Company had 
several factories and the aircraft was providing a fast connection between them. That day, 
the plane had completed already five flights without any technical problem. The last flight, 
back to the home base of the aircraft, ended by fatal accident. 
A crew consisted of three persons in total. Two flight crew members arrived with the empty 
Shorts SD3-60 to Tripoli. A cabin crew joined the crew and 38 passengers got on board of 
the aircraft in Tripoli. There were two pilots of Libyan nationality in the cockpit. Both of 
them held ATP license issued by Swiss authorities and they were properly qualified to fly 
the Shorts SD3-60. Until the accident, the captain had accumulated the total flight time of 
8814 hours with 3840 hours on the Shorts SD3-60. First-officer was quite experienced pilot, 
with total flight time of 10422 hours, as well. He was flying for Sirte Oil Company as the 
captain on the Fokker 28. 
The Shorts SD3-60 (also Shorts 360) is a commuter turbopropeller aircraft that was built by 
British manufacturer Short Brothers during the 1980s.21 It is powered by two Pratt & 
Whitney PT6A engines. The plane involved in the accident was fully airworthy. The position 
of CG calculated before the flight, was within prescribed limits. The amount of fuel on board 
fully satisfied the requirements for the flight. 
The plane was refueled and ready for take-off from Tripoli International Airport at 9:29. The 
distance from Tripoli to Marsa el-Brega is about 650 km. The cruise level of the flight was 
FL70.  Normally, the Shorts SD3-60 were not used on flight from Tripoli to Marsa el-Brega. 
The aircraft has a small range to fly to Marsa el-Brega without refueling. As it is not a 
pressurized aircraft, it has a low cruise level to overfly the sea becasue the Libyan regulations 
don´t permit lower flight level than FL130. As the flight with refueling is not very 
comfortable, for a final leg of the flight, pilots used to request air traffic control to fly directly 
to Marsa el-Brega in maximum distance of 10 miles from a cost at low flight level. On 13 
January 2000, the Shorts SD3-60 got the permission to overfly the sea as approaching Marsa 
el-Brega airport. At 11:25, when the aircraft was 40 miles from Marsa el-Brega, the pilots 
started to descend from the cruising flight level 70. At 11:36 left engine stopped to work. 
One and half a minute after, right engine flamed out. The pilots declared an emergency but 
                                                 
21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_360 
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only on the company frequency 131.5 where nobody responded. After a minute of gliding, 
without any thrust of the engines, the airplane ditched to the sea at 10° nose up attitude and 
with flaps in retracted position. During the impact with the water surface, the airframe was 
destroyed and many people drown because they didn´t know how to use or where to find an 
emergency equipment. 
Some parts of the flight were flown under IMC.viii The air temperature at the cruising flight 
level was -2°C. The aircraft flight manual recommends to turn on engine anti-icing 
equipment when outside air temperature is 6°C or below. In case of flight in mist, fog, clouds 
(the areas of high relative humidity) or when flying in a distance of 500ft (or less) vertically 
from cloud base or in precipitations, engine anti-icing must be always turned-on. The crew 
observed that they were flying in icing conditions because of ice deposit which accreted on 
a windscreen. They activated the pitot-static ant-icing systems, ice detectors and windscreen 
anti-icing but they did not turn on the engine anti-icing system. Ice deposit that had built up 
on the engine inlets started to melt when the aircraft entered to the warmer air, during the 
descent. The pieces of ice entering to the engine leaded to the flame out of both engines. 
This could be avoided by turning on an ignition switch which provides re-ignition of the 
engine in case of flame out. However neither the igniters nor the engine anti-icing was turned 
on. The other hint that could help to reveal the engine inlet icing is an increase of the engine 
temperatures. But as the CVRix record demonstrates, the pilots were not fully concentrated 
on the flight and they didn´t observed any suspicious variation of the engine temperatures. 
2223
viii IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
ix CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder 
 
                                                 
22 http://www.sust.admin.ch/pdfs/AV-berichte//1732.pdf 
23 http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20000113-0 
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5.1.5.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 13 - Engine flame-out, Shorts SD3-60 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defences 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
Descent 
from colder 
air to 
warmer air  
Ice accretion 
on the engine 
inlets 
Engine flame-
out 
De-icing 3A 
 
5.1.6 Blocked elevator controls, BAe 146-300 (Investigation report, 2006) 
 Date: 12 March 2005 
 Operator: cargo company 
 Registration: unknown 
 Location: en-route, between Frankfurt and Stuttgart 
 Type of occurrence: Serious incident 
On 12 March 2005, the BAe 146-300 was transporting some cargo from Frankfurt to 
Stuttgart. The aircraft was climbing from FL80 to FL100 with autopilot engaged. Suddenly, 
the crew started to have the problems with slow pitch oscillations with increasing amplitude. 
It resulted in a variation of the angle of attack up to 18° altered by sink rate up to 4 500 
ft/min. The aircraft had flew in IMC and in icing conditions until pilots regained the control 
by disengaging the autopilot and by using the elevator trim. They continued the flight at 
FL130 under VMCx. Even if there were no icing conditions at this flight level, the problems 
with the controls persisted. Pilots were forced to finish the flight in Stuttgart, where better 
meteorological conditions were expected, by using elevator trim to control the pitch. 
Immediately after the landing, the BAe 146-300 was examined. A layer of “frozen and 
swollen up de-icing fluid residues” were found in the gap between elevator and horizontal 
stabilizer and in the area of ailerons and rudder. Luckily, the residues hadn´t blocked the 
yaw and roll controls but it jammed elevator movements. As the BAe 146-300 is the aircraft 
with non-powered flight controls (the elevator is controlled by mechanically operated servo 
tabs), pilots were not able to develop sufficient force to overcome the blocked elevator.  
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The flight nearly resulted in catastrophe, because of the development of residues from de-
icing and anti-icing liquids. Several types of de-icing and anti-icing fluids are used to treat 
an aircraft before a flight. Some of the liquids are thickened, for example SAExi Type II 
(used on the BAe 146-300), Type III or Type IV. These types of anti-icing fluids contain 
small amount of polymers, which create a thick layer on the anti-iced surfaces. The polymers 
are used in anti-icing fluids to prolong hold-over time. When the fluid dries or it shears off 
the airframe, the polymers persist on the airframe. An excessive quantity of rehydrated 
polymers can influence aerodynamic performance of the aircraft or it can mechanically block 
the controls. The problem of the polymers is that it easily absorbs the humidity from the air. 
The polymers that accumulate high water content are very dangerous in the freezing 
temperatures. Even a small amount of them, which freezes in a small gap on the airframe, 
can block the controls as it had happened on the flight from Frankfurt to Stuttgart. (Figure 
19) 
Other 40 occurrences caused by anti-icing fluids happened in Europe apart from this serious 
incident during year 2004. That´s why the aircraft manufacturer BAe organized a meeting 
in May 2005 to discuss the problem. The results of the meeting were that it is necessary to 
amend some operational procedures connected with the usage of anti-acing liquids. The 
investigation of the incident of the BAe 146-300 confirms that there is a need to replace the 
thickened fluids with un-thickened de-icing fluids mainly on the airplanes with non-powered 
flight controls. In winter, the precautions should be taken to avoid the accumulation of the 
anti-icing fluids residues on an airframe. 
x VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
xi SAE Society of Automotive Engineers standards 
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Figure 19 – Anti-icing fluid residues development 
 
© Boeing, 201024 
 
5.1.6.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 14 - Blocked elevator controls, BAe 146-300 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Ground  
anti-icing 
Application 
of thickened 
anti-icing 
liquid 
Accumulation 
of anti-icing 
liquid 
residues on 
an airframe 
Controls 
blockage 
Pre-flight 
check, 
unthickened 
anti-icing 
liquids 
5D 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/2010_q4/2/#fig1 
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5.1.7 Airspeed indicator error, Airbus A320-200 (Investigation report, 2010) 
 Date: 24 January 2007 
 Operator: Air Berlin 
 Registration: D-ABDI 
 Location: in climb from Nuremberg to London 
 Type of occurrence: Serious incident 
The A320-200 of Air Berlin was performing scheduled flight from Nuremberg to London. 
The airplane departed from Nuremberg airport at 08:04 LTxii. It was passing FL120 when 
the crew heard a strange bang coming from below the windscreen parts of the fuselage. All 
the airspeed indicators in the cockpit started to show different values of actual airspeed at 
this moment. ECAMxiii informed the crew about ADR 1xiv, ADR 2 and ADR 3 units fault. 
The A320-200 uses ADR unit to determine the airspeed of the aircraft. ADR 1 and ADR 2 
units are backed up by ADR 3 unit. If all three units don´t work, the crew will not get the 
information about airspeed from pressure measuring equipment.  
Autopilot disengaged and pilots controlled the aircraft manually. The pilot in-command 
complained about the tendency of the aircraft to drift to the right. They thought that the plane 
is damaged because of this controls problem and because of the sound pilots heard. They 
stopped the climb in FL130 and entered to a holding pattern. Pilots tried to solve the problem 
by resetting the FACxv. As it didn´t help, they decided to divert to Frankfurt airport. The 
A320-200 safely landed at Frankfurt airport. The aircraft went directly to the maintenance 
center and the faulty ADR unit was replaced. No other visible damage was discovered on 
the aircraft. 
There were three pilots in the cockpit during the flight. At the beginning of the flight, trainee 
co-pilot was seating on the right seat. When the aircraft started to have the problems, pilot 
in-command requested the other co-pilot to take the place of the trainee pilot. All of them 
were qualified and prepared for the flight. 
The weather in Nuremberg was under influence of low pressure area. The snow had been 
falling (about 20 cm) during the night before the flight. Air temperature and dew point 
temperature had the same value of -5 °C. The cloud base was at approximately 600 ft. The 
visibility had a tendency to deteriorate because of the snowfall. During the climb, the snow 
continued to fall and the intensity of precipitations was increasing. The aircraft was flying 
through an inversion layer and the temperature increased up to 1 °C between FL100 and 
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FL120 when the crew heard the strange noise.  The investigation says that a possible cause 
of the incident was that the ice accreted on the fuselage which wasn´t de-iced before the 
flight. It started to melt when the aircraft was passing through the inversion layer and it 
blocked the pressure probes. However this suspicion could not be confirmed because the 
aircraft wasn´t examined on the presence of the water inside the pressure probes when it 
landed in Frankfurt.  
5.1.7.1 Safety risk assessment 
 
Table 15 - Airspeed indicator error, Airbus A320-200 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defences 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
Flight 
through an 
inversion 
layer in 
freezing 
temperature 
Melting ice 
deposit 
Pressure 
probes 
blockage 
Pressure 
probes 
construction 
3D 
xii LT Local Time 
xiiiECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor 
xiv ADR Air Data Reference 
xv FAC Flight Augmentation Computers 
                                                 
 
5.1.8 High altitude stall, Airbus A330-200 (PALMER, 2013) 
 Date: 1 June 2009 
 Operator: Air France 
 Registration: F-GZCP 
 Location: the Atlantic Ocean, near Brazilian coast 
 Type of occurrence: Fatal accident 
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Air France 447 took off from Rio de Janeiro Galeão airport outbound to Paris Charles de 
Gaulle airport at 22:29 UTC. It was prepared for a 12 hour flight across the Atlantic Ocean. 
A330-200 climbed to its cruising flight level FL350 after the departure. When it was passing 
the altitude of approximately 20 000 ft, First Officer Robert left the cockpit to have about 
three hours of rest break. As it was the transatlantic flight, the aircraft had to contact the 
ATC by HFxvi communication at defined point. On its route AF447 had to pass several 
oceanic FIRsxvii where only HF communication and ADS-Cxviii was available. ADS-C is a 
special type of automatic ground-air communication used on transatlantic flights during 
which information about flight are transmitted via satellite or HF means. ADS logon has to 
be done by the crew and correct flight plan data must be uploaded to the ground ATC system 
communicating with the aircraft to start the ADS-C communication. Air France 447 made 
an attempt to start ADS-C communication with Dakar oceanic control. It was unsuccessful 
the first time because controller hadn´t uploaded the flight plan data into the system. Second 
and third attempts were not successful again because the controller didn´t input the correct 
data about the flight 447 into the system. That´s why the crew continued the flight using HF 
communication only. The aircraft approached the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone at 01:35 
UTC. There were some active thunderstorms in that zone so the crew wanted to climb above 
it. Unfortunately, it was impossible as the A330-200 was too heavy and the performance of 
the aircraft didn´t allowed it. From 01:49 UTC the airplane was out of the ATC radar 
coverage. At 02:00 UTC First Officer Robert came back to the cockpit. The captain informed 
him about HF communication frequencies and he left the cockpit to take a rest. First Officer 
Robert took a left seat in the cockpit but First Officer Bonin, who was seating on the right 
seat, was the pilot flying and the pilot in command when captain was absent. First Officer 
Bonin got a short briefing about weather and flight status to First Officer Robert because 
captain hadn´t informed Robert about it. Only a few minutes after arrival of First Officer 
Robert from the rest, the aircraft encountered light and moderate turbulences. They had 
advised the cabin crew about the weather but they had expected that they would pass through 
it quickly. At 02:08 UTC they made a deviation in heading of 12° to the left because of the 
thunderstorms. A minute after that they experienced another turbulence during which a 
sound typical of ice crystals hitting the fuselage was heard. The pitot tubes clogged with ice 
crystals. The airspeed indicators started to show misleading data. As airspeed data are used 
by aircraft´s systems to recalculate the altitude and the vertical speed, the altitude indicator 
and the vertical speed indicator showed slightly incorrect values corresponding to the 
incorrect low airspeed indication. The autopilot disconnected and the airplane´s flight 
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control law changed to Alternate 2B. It means that many of the built-in protections shut 
down and roll inputs sensitivity was increased. First Officer Bonin took the controls of the 
aircraft. He pulled up immediately as the vertical speed indicator was showing incorrectly 
the descent rate of 600 ft/min. The aircraft started to roll and Bonin used the lateral controls 
to stabilize the aircraft. He over-controlled the aircraft because Alternate 2B flight control 
law increased the sensitivity to roll inputs and it took him about 30 seconds to get the airplane 
back under control. Bonin was still pulling up and the vertical speed reached its maximum 
of 6 900 ft/min when Robert instructed Bonin to watch his vertical speed. Bonin reduced 
pitch but the aircraft continued to climb. Robert repeated his worries about the excessive rate 
of climb. Bonin progressively reduced the rate of climb to 4 000 ft/min and after that to 1 400 
ft/min. At 02:10:50 UTC, the pilots made an attempt to call the captain back to the cockpit. 
As Bonin increased the pitch again, the aircraft started to stall and it encountered a series of 
alternating roll movements. The stall warning activated for about 45 seconds. Bonin reacted 
by roll inputs and he applied a full thrust while he was still pulling up. At 02:11:07 UTC the 
pitot tubes became clear of ice and the airspeed was indicated correctly from this moment. 
With the full power applied, the aircraft reached a maximum altitude of 37 924 ft. The stall 
warning activated again. Bonin was still pulling up but the airplane started to descend and 
roll to the right. The pilots tried to counteract the roll movement but they didn´t have control 
of the aircraft. The rate of descent increased to 10 000 ft/min and it was oscillating between 
10 000 ft/min and 15 000 ft/min until the end of the flight. The aircraft had still positive pitch 
attitude and the angle of attack reached the value of 40°. Only the roll inputs and the 
automatic yaw damper function avoided the aircraft to enter the spin. At 02:11:42 UTC the 
captain returned back to the cockpit. The pilots explained him that they had loosed control 
of the aircraft and that they didn´t understand what had been happening. Till 02:13:18 UTC 
the A330-200 had loosed nearly 28 000 ft of altitude. When they were passing the altitude 
of 9 000 ft, Bonin declared that he was pulling up nearly all the time. Robert pushed his side 
stick forward but Bonin was still pulling up. In this case the A330-200 sum up the commands 
from both pilots. That´s why it resulted in no change in attitude. The captain instructed pilots 
to do not climb and Robert requested to have the controls. He decreased the pitch angle to 
7° below the horizon. When the aircraft was passing 4 000 ft Bonin pulled up again. He 
switched on the takeover button to get a priority to his commands and he applied the full 
thrust. At altitude of 2 500 ft GPWSxix activated and warned about sink rate. At 02:14.28 
UTC the aircraft crashed to the ocean at 16° nose up with forward and vertical speed of 107 
kt (10 900 ft/min). 
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The flight crew was qualified for the flight. There were three pilots in the cockpit because 
of the long transatlantic flight. The captain was an experienced pilot with approximately 
11 000 flight hours. First Officer Robert had accumulated over 6 500 hours of flight time 
and about 4 500 hours of which were in the A330. First Officer Bonin was the least 
experienced and the youngest pilot on board with total flight time of approximately 3 000 
hours (800 hours on the A330). 
Air France 447 was flying through Intertropical Convergence Zone on the route to Paris. The 
weather conditions were complicated in this area. The problem of the zone is that the 
thunderstorms have an enormous power there. In addition, it could be hard to estimate the 
dimensions of the clouds and the force of the updrafts because Inter Tropical Zone´s 
thunderstorms are poorly identifiable by radars and lightning intensity is much lower in 
comparison with the mid-latitudes thunderstorms. The A330-200 was overflying one of the 
well-developed Cumulonimbus when it encountered severe ice crystals icing. Even if the 
aircraft was equipped with de-iced pitot tubes, the quantity of ice crystals that was entering 
the pitot tube was bigger than the capability of de-icing equipment. It resulted in a blockage 
of the pitot tubes.  
The final report from investigation of the accident says that the ice crystals icing “was known 
but misunderstood by the aviation community at the time of the accident.” It summarizes 
that the misleading airspeed indication disorientated the pilots. The problems with handling 
the airplane in turbulent air and in high altitude leaded to destabilization of the flight. Despite 
the signs of stall (stall warning, strong buffet), “the crew never understood that they were 
stalling and consequently never applied a recovery maneuver.” The report sums up that the 
initial misunderstanding of the situation did not allowed the pilots to find the solution to save 
the flight. 
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5.1.8.1 Safety risk assessment 
Table 16 - High altitude stall, Airbus A330-200 
 
xvi HF High Frequency 
xvii FIR Flight Information Region 
xviii ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract 
xix GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 
                                                 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the hazard 
Hazard-
related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight 
operations in 
Intertropical 
Convergence 
Zone 
Cruise flight 
in the upper 
troposphere 
Ice crystal 
icing 
Pitot tubes 
blockage 
Pitot-
tubes de-
icing 
3A 
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6 Recommendations to increase the level of safety 
Table 17 – Summary of all accidents from the chapter 5.1 regrouped by the type of operation 
or activity 
Type of 
operation or 
activity 
Generic 
hazard 
Specific 
components 
of the 
hazard 
Hazard-related 
consequences 
Existing 
defenses 
to control 
safety 
risk(s)  
Safety 
risk 
index 
Flight in 
significant 
weather 
 
Approach 
/holding in 
an area of 
supercooled 
precipitatio
ns 
Severe rime 
and clear 
airframe 
icing 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance – roll 
upset, stall 
De-icing 
boots 
4A 
Precision 
approach in 
freezing fog 
Wing icing - 
clear ice 
Stall Operational 
procedures 
3B 
Descent 
through the 
layer of 
clouds 
Wing icing - 
glaze/mixed 
ice 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance – roll 
upset 
De-icing 
boots 
4A 
Descent 
from colder 
air to 
warmer air  
Ice accretion 
on the engine 
inlets 
Engine flame-out De-icing 
equipment 
3A 
Flight 
through an 
inversion 
layer in 
freezing 
temperature 
Melting ice 
deposit 
Pressure probes 
blockage 
Pressure 
probes 
location 
3D 
Preflight-
check 
Condition 
of the 
surface of 
an aircraft 
Frost deposit 
on the 
airframe 
Degraded 
aerodynamic 
performance – 
MTOW exceeded, 
stall 
Ground  
de-icing 
4B 
Ground 
anti-icing 
Application 
of thickened 
anti-icing 
liquid 
Accumulatio
n of anti-
icing liquid 
residues on 
an airframe 
Controls blockage Pre-flight 
check, 
unthickened 
anti-icing 
liquids 
5D 
Flight 
operations 
in 
Intertropical 
Convergence 
Zone 
Cruise 
flight in the 
upper 
troposphere 
Ice crystal 
icing 
Pitot tubes 
blockage 
Pitot-tubes 
de-icing 
3A 
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6.1 Safety analysis outcome 
In order to identify the safety risk index of each occurrence, I tried to discover all other 
situations where the aircraft´s safety margins were reduced by the same hazard related 
consequences. After this analysis I was able to set down the probability index of the 
occurrences. When you study the Table 17, it can be inferred that the most frequently 
assigned probability index is the index 3. This index defines a “Remote” probability of an 
occurrence. It means “Unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely)”, as it is defined 
in the ICAO Doc 9859. I tried to focus the safety analysis on the icing related occurrences, 
which happened during the last 20 years. If the occurrence has the severity index 3 assigned 
in the Table 17, it means that the occurrence was rare or it happened only once during the 
analysed period.  
All the occurrences with the hazard related consequence of the degraded aerodynamic 
performance have the probability index 4 (Occasional) assigned. It´s caused by a high rate 
of repetition of the problem as it is also described in the paragraphs where the accidents are 
analysed. I hesitated to class the accident of Cessna Citation to the degraded aerodynamic 
performance group because the stall was caused by the ice accretion on the wings. Finally, I 
made a decision that I will define a separate hazard related consequence “stall” for this 
occurrence. The reason is that Cessna suggested to solve the problem encountered during 
this accident mainly by amending operational procedures (increasing the approach speed) 
for the flight in the icing condition. It is in contrast with the accidents from the “degraded 
aerodynamic performance” group where the ADs modifying the construction of the plane 
were issued. 
The highest probability index 5 (Frequent) is assigned to the hazard related consequence of 
the controls blockage by the anti-icing liquid. This occurrence type repeated forty times in 
Europe within the year 2004. 
A parallel can be deduced between the problems of A320 and A330 as both the occurrences 
were initiated by the pressure probes problems. The biggest difference is in the severity index 
assigned. The flight of A320 could be classified as an incident where the emergency 
procedures were in use by the index D (Minor - Moderate). The A330 accident with multiple 
fatalities must be classified by the severity index A (Catastrophic). All the other occurrences 
have the severity index assigned following the criteria from the Table 8. The severity index 
of the second occurrence of ATR 42 described in the paragraph 5.1.1 could be lower than A 
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as it didn´t result in an accident. However, it is good to learn from the worst situation and 
thereafter be prepared for it. 
To move the safety analysis forward, the safety risk assessment matrix must be defined. It 
contains all the combinations of the severity and the probability indexes. 
Figure 20 - Safety risk assessment matrix  
(Safety Management Manual (SMM), 2013) 
 
The final task is to define the tolerability region of the risk in the matrix. For this purpose a 
new diagram showed in the Figure 21 - Safety risk tolerability matrix the Figure 21 is used.  
Figure 21 - Safety risk tolerability matrix  
(Safety Management Manual (SMM), 2013) 
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The tolerability regions defined in this diagram must fulfil the criteria defined by a person/an 
organization responsible for the safety risk analysis. In a case of the safety analysis of the 
icing in my work, I preserved the tolerability regions as they are defined in the ICAO Doc 
9859. I think that it corresponds quite well with a required level of safety for the operations 
in the icing environment. 
The ultimate task of the safety risk analysis is a safety risk management. The aim of the 
safety risk management is to evaluate the safety risk and to find the way how to decrease the 
risk to the minimal tolerable or acceptable region. As it is shown in the Figure 21, three main 
regions of the risk factor are basically distinguished in the safety risk tolerability matrix. The 
highest risk exists in the Intolerable region. The safety risk analysis of the icing in flight 
contains five occurrences classified in the Intolerable region. All the occurrences in the 
Intolerable region require immediate mitigation action. In case of the occurrences described, 
the mitigation actions have been already taken as the reaction on the safety investigation. 
However, there are still existing some issues where the safety level can be improved. Even 
in the Tolerable region where all the remaining three occurrences are contained. I try to 
describe these opportunities in the next paragraph. The safety risk of the occurrences from 
the Tolerable region is acceptable but a strategy to prevent the risk may be developed. We 
always need to mitigate the risk until it reaches the acceptable region. Several techniques 
can be used for that purpose. You can try to decrease the probability of an occurrence, the 
severity of an occurrence or finally you can prohibit the action if no mitigation strategy is 
effective.  
6.2 Severe icing conditions 
Important number of occurrences presented in the Chapter 5 have all the same main reason 
why they happened. It is a flight in severe icing conditions with intensity exceeding 
capability of the aircraft to cope with the icing. Flight crew has a complicated task to examine 
if the weather conditions in an area they have intentions to fly trough are flyable or they 
don´t provide a safe environment for the flight. Several products described in the chapter 2.2 
are used by pilots to solve this problems. However, it seems that these products can´t always 
provide satisfactory information. The most complicated issue is to recognize the state when 
icing starts to critically influence the flight safety. In case of probable severe icing 
conditions, pilots used to turn off the autopilot and they control the aircraft manually to 
discover any abnormal flight characteristics caused by icing as soon as possible. If the de-
icing equipment of the aircraft can´t eliminate icing accretion, emergency procedures must 
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be applied. Emergency procedures depend on the type of aircraft and are always specified in 
the flying manual. 
6.2.1 Supercooled Large Droplets 
An example of the flight in meteorological conditions exceeding capabilities of the aircraft 
that was certified to fly in icing conditions is described in chapter 5.1.1 where ATR 72 
accident near Roselawn is analysed. This occurrence brought attention to meteorological 
phenomenon of Supercooled Large Droplets (SLD) that can be very dangerous for air traffic. 
SLD are supercooled droplets with diameter exceeding 50 µm and sometimes reaching 
diameter of 5 000 µm (5 mm). The icing caused by Supercooled Large Droplets influences 
big surface of the aircraft. Unprotected airframe parts against icing are vulnerable to SLD 
icing. Large droplets with big inertia don´t freeze at the point of impact with the wing (at 
leading edge). Supercooled Large Droplets icing spreads aft of de-iced airframe regions. 
This type of ice accretions has the worse effect on the aircraft during configuration changes 
or when full power with enhanced performance is needed. If the icing builds up on 
aerodynamically important surfaces (wings, tail parts…) the safety of the flight is 
significantly reduced.  
FAA issued airworthiness directives against many turbopropeller planes with warning after 
Roselawn accident: “Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside of those 
for which the airplane is certificated. Flight in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing 
conditions (supercooled liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on protected 
surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system, or may result in ice forming 
aft of the protected surfaces. This ice may not be shed using the ice protection systems, and 
may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the airplane.” (Administration, 
1996) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, USA) requested the FAA to 
prohibit the intentional operations of ATR aircraft in known and reported icing conditions 
until a reason of the accident will be investigated. ATR Company issued the bulletins about 
operating procedures in the icing conditions. Recommended plane configuration speeds for 
the operation in the icing conditions and MMELxx (to verify if icing detection lights and ice 
detectors are operative) were updated. Special certification review of ATR 42/72 was done 
by the FAA. Flight tests in icing conditions artificially created by tanker aircraft KC135A 
were performed. The tanker plane sprayed the water on the ATR aircraft in flight at various 
airspeeds and configurations. Dangerous ice accretion was observed during the flight tests. 
As a reaction on the results of the investigation, the ATR manufacturer increased the chord 
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wise coverage of the active portion of the upper surface of the outer wing de-icing boots. 
The FAA stressed an importance of soon identification of severe icing conditions by all 
possible meanings, e.g. visual cues (ice on unheated portion of forward side windows, 
excessive accumulation of ice on the propeller spinner, use of icing detection lights in night), 
disengaging autopilot… Following recommendations were published to exit the severe icing 
conditions: 
 “Immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route 
or an altitude change to exit the severe icing conditions in order to avoid extended 
exposure to flight conditions more severe than those for which the airplane has been 
certificated.  
 Avoid abrupt and excessive manoeuvring that may exacerbate control difficulties.  
 Do not engage the autopilot. 
 If the autopilot is engaged, hold the control wheel firmly and disengage the autopilot.  
 If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control movement is observed, 
reduce the angle-of-attack. 
 Do not extend flaps during extended operation in icing conditions. Operation with 
flaps extended can result in a reduced wing angle-of-attack, with the possibility of 
ice forming on the upper surface further aft on the wing than normal, possibly aft of 
the protected area.  
 If the flaps are extended, do not retract them until the airframe is clear of ice.  
 Report these weather conditions to Air Traffic Control.” (FAA, 1996)25 
6.3 Training improvements 
High frequency of accidents caused by icing leaded the FAA to expand the regulation in this 
area. The first step was an amendment of training procedures to better prepare pilots for 
flight in icing conditions. The FAA discovered that the regulation provided a little guidance 
to the operators and to the training organizations on how to well prepare pilots for the icing. 
New training rules focus on four main issues: 
1. General icing and meteorological information 
2. Ground de-icing 
                                                 
25 
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/0/7480cb41add5d295862569820070097b!Op
enDocument&ExpandSection=-8#_Section8 
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3. Type-specific operations 
4. Company operations and procedures 
Each of the previous training part may include knowledge based training, flight training on 
a simulator or on the aircraft and some operational experience (demonstration of real 
situations and discussions about it). 
6.4 Modification of operational requirements 
Second step was an update of Part 121 requirements for operations in icing conditions. New 
rules state that after October 21, 2013 “no person may operate an airplane with a certificated 
maximum take-off weight less than 60,000 pounds in conditions conducive to airframe icing 
unless it complies with requirements defined in Part 121.” Conditions conducive to airframe 
icing are defined as meteorological conditions when visible moisture is present at or below 
a static air temperature of 5 °C or total air temperature of 10 °C unless the approved Airplane 
Flight Manual provides another definition. The requirements to operate in icing conditions 
under Part 121 are described in following paragraph: 
Certificated primary airframe ice detection system must be installed on the aircraft. When 
this system detects that the icing accretion is affecting the flight safety, the airframe ice 
protection system must be activated automatically or manually by the flight crew. Possibility 
to visually inspect for the first sign of ice formation anywhere on the plane must be provided. 
The airplane must be equipped with advisory airframe ice detection system. If the ice is 
detected visually or by using airframe ice detection system, the ice protection system must 
be activated. Activation of ice protection system may be always completed by other 
procedures defined in the Airplane Flight Manual. If the aircraft is not equipped with the 
systems to identify icing conditions specified above, the airframe ice protection system must 
be activated before and operated during the following phases of flight: 
 Takeoff climb after second segment, 
 En-route climb, 
 Go-around climb, 
 Holding, 
 Maneuvering for approach and landing, and 
 Any other operation at approach or holding airspeeds 
During any other phase of flight, the airframe ice protection system must be activated and 
operated at the first sign of ice formation anywhere on the airplane unless the Airplane Flight 
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Manual specifies that the airframe ice protection system should not be used or provides other 
operational instructions. All the procedures for operations in conditions conducive to icing 
must be specified in Airplane Flight Manual and procedures for operation of the airframe ice 
protection system must be defined.(14 CFR Part 121) 
In Europe the operating procedures for icing conditions are mainly described in EASAxxi 
Part – CAT (Commercial Air Transport Operations) regulation. It contains ground de-
icing/anti-icing procedures (CAT.OP.MPA.250) and procedures for flight in expected or 
actual icing conditions (CAT.OP.MPA.255). 
6.5 Update of aircraft certification requirements 
The latest update of regulations in the field of icing was done by the FAA at the end of the 
year 2014. In November 2014, new icing certifications standards were published in the 
FARxxii Part 25 (transport category aircraft) and they are effective from January 2015 for all 
new-designed planes (no retroactive application) with Maximum Take-off weight under 
60 000 pounds equipped with reversible flight controls. Certification standards in the Part 
25 were completed by the requirements for flight in freezing drizzle and freezing rain 
conditions. The types of ice accretion caused by freezing precipitations and their 
characteristics (drop diameter, liquid water content, mass, temperature, dimensions of the 
icing areas…) are described in the Appendix O of the Part 25. Requirements for the 
certification of airspeed indicating systems and the angle of attack measuring systems 
covering the ice crystal environment were updated by additional details. They can be found 
in Appendix D to Part 33 which contains also precautions to prevent engine icing. EASA 
has an aim to follow the steps of the FAA. In the Explanatory Note to Decision 2015/008/R, 
EASA describes intensions to introduce the new certification standards for Supercooled 
Large Droplet icing conditions (in new Appendix O to CS-25) and for ice crystals or mixed 
phase icing (in new Appendix P to CS-25). This is planned and included in the Agency’s 
Rulemaking Program for 2014-2017. 
6.6 Complicated weather and other threats 
The predominant number of occurrences presented in the Table 17 is classified as “Flight in 
significant weather” type of operation or activity. In this case, the significant weather means 
all the types of meteorological conditions presented in the chapter 4. Even if the Intertropical 
convergence zone is also the significant weather type, it is separately specified in the table 
due to its importance and particular characteristics. The other two activities in the table (Pre-
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flight check, Ground anti-icing) are the tasks that have to be finished on the ground before 
the take-off. However in case of improper handling of these operations the hazard appears 
also during flight. Insufficient pre-flight check, before the flight of the Cessna 208 presented 
in the chapter 0, that didn´t reveal frost deposit on the airframe leaded to the accident while 
the aircraft was taking-off. Anti-icing liquids, sprayed on the aircraft surface before the 
flight, blocked the controls of the BAe 146-300 (as described in the chapter 5.1.6) and the 
pilots had to face serious complications during the flight. These two accidents show an 
important role of ground de-icing/anti-icing. 
6.6.1 Ground de-icing/anti-icing 
Ground de-icing or anti-icing are two tasks which help the aircraft to stay airworthy in 
complicated meteorological conditions. Without it, flying in winter IMC (snow, high 
humidity…) would be very hard and dangerous. 
De-icing is a process of ice, snow or frost (frozen or semi frozen moisture) removal from the 
aircraft surface and the engine intake. Every aircraft is inspected for clean and smooth 
airframe surface before flight. A thin layer of frost or any other contamination on the 
airframe, especially on the wings, controls surfaces and on the propeller could lead to 
unairworthy conditions of the aircraft. That´s why each contamination on the aircraft´s 
wings, propellers or control surfaces must be cleaned before the take-off. It is called clean 
aircraft concept. 
A heated aircraft de-icing fluid is used to de-ice a plane. There exist four basic types of de-
icing/anti-icing fluids. Their specifications can be found in the SAExxiii (Society of 
Automotive Engineers) documents or in the AEAxxiv (Association of European Airlines) 
recommendations and they are defined by International Standards Organization (ISO 11075, 
ISO 11078). Type I fluid is mainly used for de-icing. It is an unthickened fluid. When it is 
used as anti-icing fluid, it provides short HOTxxv (Hold-over time). Type II – IV fluids are 
thickened fluids. They have higher viscosity and contain polymer particles that makes them 
more suitable for aircraft anti-icing. Nowadays, Type II fluid usage is diminishing and it is 
being replaced by Type IV fluid which has longer HOT time. Type III fluid, thanks to the 
smaller viscosity than Type II, IV fluid is applied mainly on the slower commuter airplanes 
with rotation speed under 100 kts. Type II fluid has the same flow-off standards as Type IV 
fluid. It is used on larger jet aircraft with rotation speed above 100 kts. 
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Every type of anti-icing fluids has the Hold-over time defined. It is a time period during 
which plane surface is protected by anti-icing fluid against ice formation. If the Hold-over 
time is exceeded and the aircraft is not taking-off, the airframe must be inspected for icing 
again or de-icing and anti-icing procedures must be repeated. That´s why de-icing/anti-icing 
in the shortest possible time before take-off is the most suitable and the safest option. At the 
end of Hold-over time anti-icing protective layer on the airframe is no longer effective.   
The Hold-over times are published by SAE/AEA/ISO in tables for each type of anti-icing 
fluid. These time values are always only guidelines which help to determine a real Hold-
over time that varies with the meteorological conditions. The HOT is reduced by strong 
wind, jet blast, heavy precipitations, and direct sunlight. All anti-icing fluids have to flow 
off from critical airframe parts (wings, control surfaces) until the speed of rotation is reached. 
The reason is that the fluids may not disturb the airflow and the performance of the aircraft 
during take-off and flight. 
Several techniques to de-ice the aircraft are used. Ground de-icing procedure depends also 
on the type of contamination and thickness of the layer covering the airframe. If the plane 
stays on an apron during snowy night, manual methods of snow removal (with brooms, 
brushes…) can be used first. In extremely low temperatures these methods are a single 
possibility how to remove snow/frost from the aircraft. In such meteorological conditions 
the effectiveness of de-icing (glycol based) fluids is very limited.26 
Ground de-icing and anti-icing can be accomplished in one step or in two steps process. One 
step process is characterized by application of heated thickened fluid on the aircraft surface. 
Two steps procedure is preferred as it minimizes the possibility of polymer residues built-
up on the airframe (read about problem with blocked elevator by polymer residues in chapter 
5.1.6). First, heated aircraft de-icing fluid is applied. It is a mixture of water, glycol solution, 
corrosion inhibitors, wetting agents and dye. Sometimes, if it is allowed by operational 
procedures, only hot water is used. Unthickened fluid is always applied in first step of two 
step procedure. If some polymer residues from previous anti-icing procedures are present on 
the airframe, they are smashed off by application of the fluid. The procedure continues in 
second step by application of anti-icing fluid. This is a substance with very similar 
composition to de-icing fluid but it shall contains polymeric thickeners. The polymer 
particles greatly absorb the humidity from the precipitations. In second step, it is more 
                                                 
26 http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/449.pdf 
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effective to apply undiluted and unheated anti-icing fluid. All surfaces must be clean before 
application of anti-icing fluid.  
The fluids used for anti-icing are based on ethylene glycol or propylene glycol. Ethylene 
glycol fluids are toxic. They have sweet taste. In the USA, bitter additives must be added to 
ethylene glycol based fluids to prevent ingestion by a child or an animal and subsequent 
intoxication. In the human metabolism ethylene glycol is oxidized to oxalic acid that is toxic 
too. Intoxication affects central nervous system, the heart and the kidneys. It causes 
abnormal development of animals (rodents are the most affected).27  
Propylene glycol fluids are not toxic. They can be used in food processing to keep a moisture 
inside the food. Propylene glycol fluids have not so favourable taste to human as ethylene 
glycol. After the ingestion it is transformed by our body to lactic acid which is a natural 
product of metabolism. Undiluted propylene glycol can sometimes slightly irritate eyes and 
respiratory tract, mainly when it is used in form of spray.28
xx Minimum Master Equipment List 
xxi European Aviation Safety Agency 
xxii Federal Aviation Regulation 
xxiii Society of Automotive Engineers 
xxiv Association of European Airlines 
xxv Hold-over time 
                                                 
An importance of anti-icing/de-icing can be inferred from an accident of Cessna Caravan 
described in the chapter 0. It was one of the 30 accidents of this type of aircraft caused by 
ice. That´s why the NTSB insisted on the FAA to prohibit the flights of Caravans in known 
ice conditions. This would cause a big problem for operators of this aircraft.  
A group of regional air cargo operators in the USA tried to solve the situation. They asked 
the engineers from Cessna and the specialists from the FAA for cooperation. Their work 
resulted in a few Airworthiness Directives.  
The first change requires “tactile” inspection of the airframe (mainly upper surface of the 
wings), no more than 5 minutes before the take-off. Five minutes limit is required, inter alia, 
because Cessna Caravans are operated under FAR 135, where no de-icing/anti-icing 
                                                 
27 http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethylenglykol 
28 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propylene_glycol 
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procedure with Type III fluid is defined. The use of the anti-icing fluid Type III could 
prolong Holdover times to more than 5 minutes. 
The second amendment is that the de-ice boots on the wing struts and on the leading edge of 
the cargo rod are required. A new speed warning system was developed. It warns the flight 
crew about IASxxvi below 110 kts when propeller heat is turned on. This warning may remind 
the pilot to check for ice accretion. During the session, new climb and descent performance 
charts for icing conditions were published. Training guidelines were updated too. They are 
more focused on flight in known ice. The flight in such conditions is now approved only 
with successfully completed Caravan Cold Weather Course.29
xxvi IAS Indicated Air Speed 
                                                 
29 http://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/airplane/Cessna-Caravan-Safety-in-Icing-Conditions.html 
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7 Conclusion 
Even if the icing is a well-known meteorological phenomena and its hazardous influence on 
the aviation safety was discovered many years ago, it is still underestimated or sometimes 
overlooked in real operations. The accidents and the incidents caused by the icing prove this 
fact. The biggest hazard exists when a plane flies in a difficult meteorological conditions. 
Area of the warm front passing through the Central Europe in the winter, the freezing drizzle 
or the freezing fog are the conditions that test the decision making qualities of every pilot.  
Sometimes un-careful pre-flight inspection or unawareness of the threat of icing can lead to 
the problems described in the Chapter 5.  
Better knowledge of meteorology can help to improve the safety of flight. That´s why the 
first part of the work is dedicated to the description of meteorological aspect of the icing. Of 
course, pilot does not need to know about all the scientific researches in icing. However it is 
crucial for him to be able to take a right decision if the icing starts to be dangerous for him 
and for the aircraft. Capability to differentiate between the moderate rime ice and severe 
clear ice is a task the pilots have to be trained for. That´s why the work contains chapter 
about identification of the icing.  
In the field of icing identification, the meteorologists and the other specialists on the icing 
have still a lot of work. The most complicated issue is to forecast freezing drizzle or freezing 
rain. There are two World Area Forecasting Centres where the icing conditions are analysed 
and the forecasts are issued. One is in the USA and the second one is the Met Office (WAFC-
London) in the United Kingdom. The Met Office is in charge of icing forecasts for Europe.  
In the last 20 years many improvements in forecasts of Super Large Droplets presence have 
been done. In America, Current Icing Potential (CIP)/ Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) reports 
are published by The Aviation Weather Centre.30 (BERNSTEIN, 2005) The Met Office in 
London provides similar information for the European region. The meteorologists from the 
Aviation Weather Centre use the numerical weather prediction models to create FIP reports. 
For CIP reports, numerical weather prediction is combined with sensor data (temperature, 
humidity, clouds…) to hourly publish 3D analysis of the icing. This analysis contains 
information about icing probability, icing severity, SLD potential. The probability of icing 
detection reaches normally 90 %. The problem is, that the output of the icing report depends 
                                                 
30 http://www.aviationweather.gov/adds/icing/icingnav 
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a lot on the method used to analyse the weather situation. When the outputs of the products 
used to forecast icing in Europe are compared to those used in the USA, big differences are 
discovered. Many times over-predictive methods are used. It means that they forecast the 
icing in an area where it will not be present. Sometimes severe icing was forecasted in the 
clear sky area. It is caused mainly because of an improper data analysis in the numerical 
weather models. New algorithms combining the observation based icing analysis and the 
numerical predicting models are being developed to make icing forecasts more accurate. 
(Morcrette, 2014) 
Thanks to the supercomputers, the numerical weather models can work with much denser 
grid of data inputs than before. It means that the probability of the forecast accuracy is 
increased and icing conditions can be discovered more easily. Precise information about 
icing will improve the quality of the flight planning and it will increase the flight safety level. 
The prevention of the safety occurrences in aviation is an ultimate goal of all this effort. 
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